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VIRTUAL SCHOOLS, STUDENT RIGHTS, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: ADJUSTING THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE TO THE 
21ST CENTURY 
Joseph O. Oluwole* 
Preston C. Green III** 
The advent of virtual schools has created uncertainty for 
school officials seeking to discipline students for speech. This 
uncertainty is fueled partly by the ostensibly omnipresent nature of 
virtual speech and partly by the fact that the United States 
Supreme Court has never ruled on the free speech rights of 
students in virtual schools. This Article analyzes the current First 
Amendment student speech jurisprudence in order to determine 
whether school officials have censorship authority over students’ 
virtual on-campus speech as well as students’ virtual off-campus 
speech. To further this analysis, it is important to understand the 
nature of virtual schools. Therefore, the Article presents an 
overview of virtual schools, the instructional methods used in 
virtual schools as well as virtual schools’ regulation of student 
behavior through acceptable use policies (“AUPs”) and student 
codes of conduct. In addition to analyzing the quartet of United 
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States Supreme Court student-speech cases, decided in the context 
of on-campus speech, for language that could provide censorship 
authority over virtual speech, the Article examines how lower 
courts address virtual students’ speech rights. It also discusses 
how courts distinguish on-campus virtual speech from off-campus 
virtual speech. Additionally, the Article presents guidelines for 
virtual schools to avoid unconstitutional exercise of censorship 
authority over student speech. Pursuant to this, the Article 
examines virtual schools under the public forum doctrine as well 
as the government speech doctrine. Finally, the Article discusses 
the First Amendment status of virtual school AUPs that censor 
offensive student speech on the basis of race, gender, or sexual 
orientation.  
DEC. 2015] Virtual Schools, Student Rights 223 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The ubiquity of the Internet in the current digital age as well as 
the prevalence of technology as a staple in student culture has 
fueled the quest for innovative ways to harness technology in 
education.1 Virtual schools constitute one such innovation designed 
to change the way schooling is delivered.2 Virtual schools are 
schools in which “learning is not bound by time, space and pace, 
liberating education systems from the confines of rigid blocks of 
time and uninspired configurations of space to better meet the 
needs of students.”3 They constitute a paradigm shift from long-
                                                
 1 Justice Oliver Holmes encouraged the competition of ideas as a means of 
encouraging free speech, rather than censorship, when he noted that “the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition 
of the market” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). In other words, information sharing and more speech is better than 
censorship. The Internet makes the sharing of information and speech more 
pragmatic and accessible. Indeed, “today, the Internet has become the latest 
realization of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ so critical to the democracy envisioned 
by the Founding Fathers.” Julie J. Geng, When Forums Collide: The San 
Francisco Bart As A Battleground For The First Amendment In The Internet 
Era, 10 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y for INFO. SOC’Y 127, 176 (2014). 
 2 See, e.g., Jan Hawkins, Technology-Mediated Communities for Learning: 
Designs and Consequences, 514 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 159, 160 
(1991). 
 3 Gregg Vanourek & Evergreen Education Group, An (Updated) Primer on 
Virtual Charter Schools: Mapping the Electronic Frontier, NACSA CYBER 
SERIES ISSUE BRIEF 3 (Sept. 2011), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED544289.pdf 
(last visited June 16, 2015). Internationally, the term “ICT”, which stands for 
Information and Communication Technologies, is also sometimes used to refer 
to virtual schools. Id. These schools are sometimes referred to as online schools, 
cyber schools, internet-based learning, distance learning schools or Web-based 
distance learning schools, eCommunity schools, networked classrooms, or 
electronic or e-schools. See Matthew D. Bernstein, Whose Choice Are We 
Talking About? The Exclusion of Students With Disabilities From For-Profit 
Online Charter Schools, 16 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 487, 489 (2013); Gillian 
Locke et al., Virtual Schools: Assessing Progress and Accountability Final 
Report of Study Findings, PUB. IMPACT 7 (2014), 
http://www.charterschoolcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/field_publication_atta
chment/Virtual%20Schools%20Accountability%20Report_0.pdf (last visited 
June 16, 2015); Paul Kim et al., Public Online Charter School Students: 
Choices, Perceptions, and Traits, 49 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 521, 522 (2012); 	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standing tradition which dictates that instruction will be delivered 
in a physical space consisting of desks or tables directed toward a 
podium, chalkboard or lecturer.4 
Public virtual schools must comply with the dictates of the 
United States Constitution with respect to students.5 Accordingly, 
the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause applies to student 
speech that occurs in virtual schools. However, school 
administrators might be confused about how to appropriately 
address First Amendment concerns in a virtual school setting. As 
the Ninth Circuit noted: 
[T]he challenge for administrators is made all the more difficult 
because, outside of the official school environment, students are instant 
messaging, texting, emailing, Twittering, Tumblring, and otherwise 
communicating electronically, sometimes about subjects that threaten 
the safety of the school environment. At the same time, school officials 
must take care not to overreact and to take into account the creative 
juices and often startling writings of the students.6 
This Article addresses the intersection of virtual schools and 
the First Amendment rights of students. Part II of the Article 
provides background information on virtual schools to foster an 
understanding of these schools. Part III provides an overview of 
the instructional methods used by virtual schools. Part IV discusses 
how virtual schools try to control behavior through acceptable use 
policies (“AUPs”) and student codes of conduct. Part V examines 
whether the quartet of United States Supreme Court cases decided 
in the context of on-campus speech apply to virtual speech and off-
campus speech. 
                                                                                                         
Margaret Lin, School Quality in the Cloud: Guidelines for Authorizing Virtual 
Charter Schools, NACSA CYBER SERIES ISSUE BRIEF 1 (2011), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED544280.pdf (last visited June 16, 2015); Joe 
Ableidinger et al., Policy Guide: Online and Blended Charter Schools, NACSA 
CYBER SERIES 1 (2012); Hawkins, supra note 2, at 160. 
 4  David Jaffee, Virtual Transformation: Web-Based Technology and 
Pedagogical Change, 31 TEACHING SOC. 227, 228 (2003). 
 5 Public schools are subdivisions and instrumentalities of the state and are 
bound by the United States Constitution, as are all subdivisions and 
instrumentalities of the state. See Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 106 
(1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964). 
 6 Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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Part VI examines how lower courts address the First 
Amendment free speech rights of virtual students in light of the 
Supreme Court’s absence on the issue. This discussion includes 
how lower courts distinguish on-campus speech from off-campus 
virtual speech. It also examines the status of off-campus virtual 
speech brought onto a school’s campus. 
Part VII discusses how virtual schools can ensure that their 
campuses are recognized by the judiciary as an expansive campus, 
increasing their authority to censor student speech. Part VIII is an 
analysis of virtual schools under the public forum doctrine while 
Part IX presents a government speech analysis of virtual student 
speech. Part X analyzes whether AUPs that restrict offensive 
speech on the basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation violate 
the First Amendment prohibition against content-based 
discrimination. 
II. OVERVIEW OF VIRTUAL SCHOOLS 
The first references to virtual schools in the educational 
literature were to two initiatives in Canada in the mid-1990s.7 The 
first two virtual schools appeared in the United States in 1997.8 
Since that time, virtual schools have experienced rapid growth.9 At 
the present time, almost 250,000 students are enrolled in these 
schools.10 At least 200,000 students attend full-time virtual schools, 
and enrollment at such schools is increasing annually at a rate of 
fifteen to twenty percent.11 Virtual schools have spread so quickly 
that twenty-seven states as well as the District of Columbia have at 
least a full-time virtual school, covering several districts or the 
                                                
 7 Vanourek & Evergreen Education Group, supra note 3. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 7. 
 10 Gary Miron & Jessica Urschel, Understanding and Improving Full-Time 
Virtual Charter Schools: A Study of the Student Characteristics, School 
Finance, and School Performance in Schools Operated by K12 Inc, NATIONAL 
EDUCATION POLICY CENTER 2 (2012) http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/ 
understanding-improving-virtual. 
 11 See Vanourek & Evergreen Education Group, supra note 3. 
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entire state.12 In fact, it is possible that by 2019 fifty percent of all 
courses in the United States in elementary through high school will 
be virtual.13 Most of the full-time virtual schools in the country are 
charter schools.14 In fact, charter schools were “early adopters” of 
virtual schools.15 
Virtual schools are typically held wholly on the Internet, giving 
students the opportunity to attend classes from anywhere with 
online access. 16  Virtual education could potentially expand a 
school’s geographic range such that it avails students of 
educational opportunities they might not otherwise have in their 
local communities.17 Margaret Lin, first executive director of the 
National Association of Charter School Authorizers (“NACSA”), 
aptly described the nature of virtual schools: 
Indeed, the way to think about a virtual charter school is simply to 
think of a “regular” charter school and remove the building: swap in a 
                                                
 12 Id.; Luis A. Huerta et al., Cyber and Home School Charter Schools: 
Adopting Policy to New Forms of Public Schooling, 81 PEABODY J. EDUC. 103, 
104-05 (2006). Gary Miron et al., Full-Time Virtual Schools: Enrollment, 
Student Characteristics, and Performance, NAT’L EDUC. POL’Y CTR. 25 (2013), 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/nepc-virtual-2013.pdf (stating that virtual schools 
“now constitute one of the fastest-growing forms of school choice” and that “an 
increasing number of district and state education agencies are now starting full-
time virtual schools”). See also Anthony G. Picciano & Jeff Seaman, K-12 
Online Learning: A 2008 Follow-Up Of The Survey of US School District 
Administrators, THE SLOAN CONSORTIUM (2009), 
http://olc.onlinelearningconsortium.org/publications/survey/k-12online2008. 
 13 Courtney B. Myers, Clayton Christensen: Why Online Education Is Ready 
For Disruption, Now, THE NEXT WEB, INC. (2011), http://thenextweb.com/ 
insider/2011/11/13/clayton-christensen-why-online-education-is-ready-for-
disruption-now/. 
 14 Vanourek & Evergreen Education Group, supra note 3. 
 15 Id. 
 16  See Kara Page, The Advantages of Virtual School, EHOW.COM, 
http://www.ehow.com/list_5965288_advantages-virtual-school.html; see also 
Ableidinger et al., supra note 3; see also Miron et al., supra note 12. 
 17 Lin, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
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computer instead and the Internet connection becomes thebus” 
transporting students to school.18 
III. INSTRUCTIONAL METHODS USED BY VIRTUAL SCHOOLS 
The four dominant methods of instructional delivery in virtual 
schools are: independent; asynchronous; synchronous; and a 
combination of asynchronous and synchronous.19 The independent 
model is similar to a traditional correspondence course except that 
the computer mediates the education experience.20 Students teach 
themselves or are taught by their parents, with minimal teacher 
involvement.21 
Most virtual schools in the United States use the asynchronous 
delivery model.22 The asynchronous instructional approach differs 
from the independent delivery model in that there is more 
interaction between teachers and students.23 Teachers also serve a 
more active role, “guiding the students through the curriculum and 
serving as the source of both formative and summative evaluation 
of the student’s work.”24 However, students still have a great deal 
of independence in that they work through the online curriculum at 
their own pace. 25  Asynchronous classes use direct messaging 
(“DM”); discussion boards such as whiteboard (“WB”) and social 
                                                
 18 Id. at 2. See also Jason Ohler, Why Distance Education?, 514 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 24 (1991) (“[I]nformation is transported, not 
people; students stay put and school comes to them.”). 
 19 See generally Huerta et al., supra note 12 (discussing the various methods 
of instructional delivery). See also June Ahn, Policy, Technology, and Practice 
in Cyber Charter Schools: Framing the Issues, 113 TEACHERS COL. REC. 1, 5 
(2011). 
 20 See generally Huerta et al., supra note 12. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Michael Barbour, Today’s Student and Virtual Schooling: The Reality, the 
Challenges, the Promise, 13 J. OF DISTANCE LEARNING 5, 14 (2009). 
 23 Michael K. Barbour & Thomas C. Reeves, The Reality of Virtual Schools: 
A Review of the Literature, 52 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 402, 405 (2009). 
 24 Id. at 406. 
 25 Id. 
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networking, such as blogs, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter to 
increase collaboration and learner interaction.26 
The synchronous approach requires students and teachers to be 
online simultaneously.27 Synchronous courses may also use chat 
rooms that allow people to interact through texting.28 Additionally, 
students could be connected to instructor presentations through 
telecommunication technology (video conferencing) or the Internet 
(web conferencing or “webinars”).29 In some cases, live video 
interactions between students and teachers are coupled with 
computer simulations, virtual personas, and instruction.30 
Under the fourth method of delivery, virtual schools use a 
combination of synchronous and asynchronous educational 
approaches.31 Michael Barbour provides an example of how virtual 
schools in remote regions of Canada apply a combination of 
synchronous and asynchronous approaches:32 
[The schools provide] synchronous instruction using the voice over 
Internet protocol software, Elluminate Live®. This software allows for 
two-way voice over the Internet, a shared, interactive whiteboard, 
instant messaging, application sharing, breakout rooms, and interactive 
quiz and surveymanagement. . . . The asynchronous instruction is 
conducted using a course management system called WebCT®. This 
                                                
 26 Barbour & Reeves, supra note 23 at 405. Synchronous vs. Asynchronous 
Classes, ELEARNERS.COM, available at http://www.elearners.com/online-
education-resources/online-learning/synchronous-vs-asynchronous-classes/ 
[hereinafter Synchronus vs. Asynchronus]. 
 27 Synchronous vs. Asynchronous, supra note 26; Huerta et al., supra note 12. 
 28 Synchronous vs. Asynchronous, supra note 26; Huerta et al., supra note 12 
at 110. 
 29 Synchronous vs. Asynchronous, supra note 26. 
 30  Christopher J. Dede, Emerging Technologies: Impacts on Distance 
Learning, 514 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 146, 151 (1991); Kim et 
al., supra note 3 at 530. Complex content can be presented through a variety of 
media including animations, audio and video recordings, visual images, quiz 
banks, virtual social lounge, virtual labs, PowerPoint and other text. Id. Students 
can also have live conversations with researchers working on a scientific 
research vessel or other experts globally. Hawkins, supra note 2, at 160 (1991). 
 31 See generally Huerta et al., supra note 12. See also Ahn, supra note 19, at 
5. 
 32 Michael Barbour, Portrait of Rural Virtual Schooling, 59 CANADIAN J. OF 
EDUC. ADMIN. & POLICY 1 (2007). 
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software provides the teacher and students with a variety of tools, 
including: a discussion forum, a shared calendar, an internal e-mail 
system, and aplace to house the course web pages.33 
Even in a virtual school environment, with or without teacher 
supervision, student behavior must be regulated so that it does not 
disrupt learning. As Judge Jordan of the United States Court of 
Appeals, Third Circuit, observed, “[m]odern communications 
technology, for all its positive applications, can be a potent tool for 
distraction and fomenting disruption.”34 
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF STUDENT BEHAVIOR 
In order to limit the disruption to the learning environment, 
public schools, including virtual schools, provide guidance for 
student behavior with respect to educational technology through 
student code of conduct policies.35 These codes of conduct often 
incorporate acceptable use policies (“AUPs”). 36  AUPs inform 
students about permissible and impermissible uses of educational 
                                                
 33 Id. at 10–11. (2007). 
 34 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 222 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring). 
 35  Georgia Dep’t of Educ., Student Codes of Conduct, 
http://www.gadoe.org/Curriculum-Instruction-and-Assessment/Curriculum-and-
Instruction/Pages/Student-Code-of-Conduct.aspx (last visited June 21, 2015). 
Student codes of conduct identify acceptable and unacceptable behavior in a 
school. Id. They also outline possible consequences for violations. Owensboro 
Public Schools, 2015-2016 Code of Acceptable Behavior and Discipline, 
http://www.owensboro.kyschools.us/discipline_handbook.pdf (last visited Oct. 
19, 2015). 
 36 Patrick D. Paukin, Morse v. Frederick and Cyber-bullying in Schools: The 
Impact of Freedom of Expression, Disciplinary Authority, and School 
Leadership, in TRUTHS AND MYTHS OF CYBER-BULLYING: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON STAKEHOLDER RESPONSIBILITY AND STUDENT SAFETY 159, 
160 (Shaheen Sharif & Andrew H. Churchill, eds.) (2009). 
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technology.37 They emphasize to students that use of the school’s 
server and technology system is a privilege rather than a right.38 
AUPs are designed to protect the school from educational 
disruption and to preclude or minimize student exposure to danger 
and hurtful information online while harnessing opportunities for 
digital learning.39 Violations of the AUP can result in disciplinary 
action such as suspension, expulsion, litigation and termination of 
the student’s access to the school’s server and technology system.40 
                                                
 37 Philip T.K. Daniel & Silas McCormack, Technological Advances, Student 
Expression, and the Authority of Student Officials, 248 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 
553, 574 (2009). 
 38  See, e.g., Clark Cty Sch. Dist., Acceptable Use Policy, 
http://ccsd.net/district/acceptable-use-policy/ (last visited June 21, 2015); Austin 
ISD, Austin Independent School District Acceptable Use Guidelines, 
https://www.austinisd.org/sites/default/files/dept/technology/docs/AU_Guidelin
es_20131206.pdf (last visited June 21, 2015); Greenville County Schools, 
Greenville County Schools Acceptable Use Policy (AUP), 
http://www.greenville.k12.sc.us/Departments/main.asp?titleid=etsaup (last visited 
June 21, 2015). 
 39  James Bosco, Rethinking Acceptable Use Policies to Enable Digital 
Learning: A Guide for School Districts, COSN 2–3 (March 2013), 
http://www.cosn.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Revised%20AUP%20March%20201
3_final.pdf (last visited June 16, 2015). 
 40 Owensboro Public Schools, supra note 35 at 26; Louisiana Virtual School, 
Acceptable Use Policy, LA VIRTUAL SCH. 2009-2010, 1–2 (2010), available at 
http://publications.sreb.org/2009/LVSAcceptableUse.pdf (last visited June 21, 
2015); Greenville County Schools, Greenville County Schools Acceptable Use 
Policy (AUP), available at http://www.greenville.k12.sc.us/Departments/ 
main.asp?titleid=etsaup (last visited June 21, 2015); The School District of 
Philadelphia, ACCEPTABLE USE OF INTERNET, SCH. DIST. OF PHILA. 
OPERATIONS 1, 11 (2014), available at http://www.philasd.org/offices/ 
administration/policies/815.pdf; Austin ISD, Austin Independent School District 
Acceptable Use Guidelines 1, 2, available at https://www.austinisd.org/sites/ 
default/files/dept/technology/docs/AU_Guidelines_20131206.pdf (last visited 
June 21, 2015); see Michigan Virtual School, Acceptable Use Policy, MICH. 
VIRTUAL SCH. (2015), available at http://www.mivhs.org/Students/Getting-
Started/Acceptable-Use-Policy (last visited June 16, 2015) (“Any user accounts 
found to be violating these service limitations will be terminated without 
warning or recourse at the sole discretion of MVU [Michigan Virtual 
University] . . . In such cases, where an account is terminated for service 
violations as detailed in this or the following two sections; no refunds or credit 
will be offered, and the User acknowledges that their account termination may 	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Use of the school’s technology is often conditioned on parent 
and/or student signed consent to comply with the AUP’s terms.41 
Even when the signed consent is not imposed as a condition of use, 
schools generally require parent and/or student signatures 
affirming understanding of and consent to the terms of AUP.42 
                                                                                                         
result in course failure as well as other disciplinary action.”). Michigan Virtual 
School’s policy also includes the following disciplinary terms: 
Any user’s failure to abide by the MVS [Michigan Virtual School] 
Acceptable Use Policy could result in any or all of the following actions: 
A.The immediate removal of the user’s access to all MVS instructional 
computing resources. 
B. The immediate removal of the user from their course(s) and termination 
of any teaching assignment(s). 
C. The involvement of law enforcement agencies and subsequent legal 
action.  
Michigan Virtual School, Acceptable Use Policy, MICH. VIRTUAL SCH. 1, 4-5 
(2015), available at http://www.mivhs.org/Students/Getting-Started/Acceptable-
Use-Policy (last visited June 16, 2015). See also Clark County School District, 
Acceptable Use Policy, available at http://ccsd.net/district/acceptable-use-
policy/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2015) (“The system administrators reserve the right 
to terminate access to the District’s computer network resources if this AUP is 
violated while using real-time chat features, including video conferencing.”). 
 41 See, e.g., Louisiana Virtual School, supra note 40 at 2 (“No student will be 
allowed to participate in the Louisiana Virtual School unless a completed (and 
appropriate)Internet Usage Contract has been submitted to both the Louisiana 
Virtual School and the student’s home district.”); see also Florida Virtual 
School, Student and Parent Handbook, FLA VIRTUAL SCH 2015-16, 63 (2015), 
http://www.flvs.net/myFLVS/student-handbook/Documents/Student_Parent_Ha 
ndbook.pdf (providing that infringing students “may be refused participation in 
Florida Virtual School [FLVS] courses.”). 
 42 For a sample AUP contract requiring student and parent acknowledgement 
of understanding and consent to the AUP’s terms, see LA Virtual School, supra 
note 40. See also Virginia Department of Education, STUDENT AND PARENT 
HANDBOOK: VIRTUAL VIRGINIA 13 EDUC. 12 (2014), available at 
http://www.virtualvirginia.org/students/handbook/downloads/student_handbook.
pdf (last visited June 21, 2015) (“Each student will acknowledge his/her 
willingness to abide by Virtual Virginia’s Acceptable Use Policy . . . “). See also 
id. at 17 (“STUDENTS ACCEPT THE TERMS OF THIS ACCEPTABLE USE 
POLICY BY CLICKING AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THEY ACCESS 
THEIR COURSE CONTENT FOR THE FIRST TIME.”); SCH. DIST. OF PHILA. 
OPERATIONS, ACCEPTABLE USE OF INTERNET, COMPUTERS AND NETWORK 
RESOURCES 4–5 (2014), http://www.philasd.org/offices/administration/ 	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The AUP of the Owensboro Kentucky School District is 
typical for public schools. 43  The Owensboro School District 
provides “students access to electronic information, including the 
Internet and email, through a service called OPS Net.”44 Students 
have access to OPS Net both at home and at school.45 The AUP 
provides that “[s]chool district personnel have the right to access 
information stored in any user directory, on the current user screen, 
or in electronic mail.”46 Thus, “[s]tudents should not expect files 
stored on District servers or through District provided or 
sponsored technology services to be private.”47 
The Owensboro AUP also provides that students will use its 
computing resources lawfully and respectfully.48 For instance, the 
AUP prohibits students from using the district’s electronic services 
for creating, distributing, accessing or obtaining information that is 
prejudicial, sexually explicit, discriminatory, harassing, disruptive 
to learning or bullies other students.49 Many public virtual schools 
have AUPs governing student computing behavior similar to that 
of Owensboro school district set forth above. The Agora Cyber 
Charter School’s AUP, for instance, warns that the failure to 
follow the guidelines set therein could result in removal of the 
student’s access to the school’s instructional computing services, 
suspension or expulsion; or “[i]nvolvement with law enforcement 
                                                                                                         
policies/815.pdf (last visited June 22, 2015) (“By accessing the district’s Internet 
. . . computers and network resources . . . users acknowledge awareness of the 
provisions of this policy and awareness that the district uses monitoring systems 
to monitor and detect inappropriate use and may use tracking systems to track 
and recover lost or stolen equipment.”). 
 43 All virtual schools covered in this Article are public schools. 
 44 Owensboro Public School, supra note 35 at 26. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. See also CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, supra note 40 (stating that 
“[e]lectronic mail is not private.. . . . As with written communication . . . users 
should recognize there is no expectation of privacy for electronic mail.”). 
FLORIDA VIRTUAL SCHOOL supra note 41 (“Email is not private. Never say 
anything via email that you wouldn’t mind seeing on the school bulletin board 
or in the local newspaper.”). 
 47 Owensboro Public School, supra note 35 at 26. (emphasis in original). 
 48 Id. at 27. 
 49 Id.  
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agencies and possible legal action.”50 Among other things, Agora’s 
AUP requires parents and students to follow “netiquette” or 
network etiquette in communicating with others online.51 The AUP 
states that students should “[n]ever use derogatory comments, 
including those regarding race, age, gender, sexual orientation, 
religion, ability, political persuasion, body type, physical or mental 
health, or access issues.”52 Students are also warned that swear 
words are unacceptable.53 
Louisiana Virtual School’s AUP, on the other hand, prohibits 
“sites that contain obscene, pornographic, pervasively vulgar, 
excessively violent, or sexually harassing information or 
material.”54 
Even as virtual schools attempt to regulate student speech, it is 
important that they comply with the dictates of the First 
Amendment. 
V. VIRTUAL SCHOOLS AND THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE 
A. Case Law 
As public schools, virtual public schools must comply with the 
Free Speech Clause when regulating student expression.55 While 
the United States Supreme Court has never ruled on online 
on-campus or off-campus student speech, in a quartet of cases, the 
Court has held that schools may punish student speech in certain 
situations. These cases are Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
                                                
 50 Agora Cyber Charter School, 2011-2012 SCHOOL HANDBOOK 42 (2011), 
http://agora.k12start.com/images/schools/2011-12_Agora_Student_Handbook_ 
FINAL_11-14-11_-_4-20-12_COA.pdf. Agora Cyber Charter School is a public 
virtual school for Pennsylvania students. 
 51 Id. at 43. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Lousiana Virtual School, supra note 40. 
 55 Lisa M. Pisciotta, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment Framework 
For Educators Who Seek To Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 
635, 648 (2000). 
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Community School District;56 Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser;57 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier;58 and Morse v. 
Frederick.59 This section examines whether virtual schools can 
restrict online student speech (on-campus and off-campus) under 
the quartet of United States Supreme Court cases governing the 
student-speech jurisprudence. 
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
In this case, three students filed a First Amendment claim 
against their school district after school officials suspended them 
for refusing to remove black armbands they wore to school in 
protest of the Vietnam War.60 Prior to the students wearing their 
armbands to school, school officials learned of the planned 
armband protest and preemptively passed a policy authorizing 
officials to discipline students who failed to comply with school 
demands to remove their armbands.61 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Iowa ruling that school officials 
acted constitutionally since they were trying to avoid disruption at 
the school. 62  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review 
whether the First Amendment permits school officials to censor 
student speech that disrupts a school. 
This was the Supreme Court’s first ever decision about the 
First Amendment free speech rights of students. Consequently, the 
Court started by acknowledging that students have First 
Amendment rights in public schools. Specifically, the Court 
declared that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”63 This talismanic statement, 
which recognized a schoolhouse gate, has appeared in almost every 
                                                
 56 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 57 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 58 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 59 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 60 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 504–05. 
 63 Id. at 506. 
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student speech case since then.64 The metaphoric schoolhouse gate 
demarcates the boundaries between on-campus speech and off-
campus speech. The statement implies that students do not lose 
their free speech rights simply because they step beyond the 
schoolhouse gate onto school grounds. Even though the Court did 
not have occasion to address online speech, it is evident today that 
“Tinker’s ‘schoolhouse gate’ is not constructed solely of the bricks 
and mortar surrounding the school yard.”65 Therefore, Tinker and 
its mandates arguably apply to virtual public schools. Besides, as 
public schools, virtual schools are subject to the First Amendment. 
The Tinker Court ruled, however, that students’ rights within 
the school are not as broad as those outside the school because of 
the need for order and discipline at school.66 Accordingly, the 
Court created the material and substantial disruption test for 
determining when schools can discipline students for speech.67 
This test provides that school officials can discipline students for 
their speech if there is actual, or reasonable forecast of, material 
and substantial disruption.68 The Supreme Court has never required 
a “magic number of students or classrooms that must be affected 
by the speech” in order to satisfy the material and substantial 
disruption test.69 Instead the test is based on a case-by-case factual 
inquiry.70 
                                                
 64 See, e.g., Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1988); Beussink v. 
Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F.Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Killion 
v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Mardis 
v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 684 F.Supp.2d 1114, 1117 (E.D. Mo. 2010); 
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 212 (3d Cir. 
2011); Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (N.D. Miss. 
2012). 
 65 Layshock ex rel. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 216. 
 66 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505–08. 
 67 Id. at 509. This test is also simply referred to as the Tinker test. 
 68 See id. at 512–14. 
 69 J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1111 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 70  Id. See also Todd D. Erb, A Case for Strengthening School District 
Jurisdiction to Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
257, 266 (2008) (“There is not a precise test for what defines a substantial 	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The Tinker Court warned school officials to avoid disciplining 
students on the basis of “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance.” 71  Besides, “school officials cannot suppress 
‘expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to 
contend.’” 72  The unpleasantness, unpopularity, controversy, or 
discomfort of speech is not a constitutional basis for disciplining 
students for speech. 73  Students also cannot be restricted to 
officially-sanctioned speech.74 
The Court held that the students in Tinker could not be 
disciplined for their armbands because their speech did not actually 
materially and substantially disrupt the school, and there was no 
basis to reasonably forecast material and substantial disruption.75 
The Court reasoned that only a very small proportion of the 18,000 
students wore the armbands.76 Furthermore, the armbands did not 
instigate any violence or threats at the school.77 The Court also 
ruled that the fact that student speech generates discussion outside 
the confines of a classroom is not alone sufficient ground for 
discipline.78 In the context of virtual schools, the classroom could 
be the learning management system or other mediating technology 
used to congregate students for a class session. 
                                                                                                         
disruption . . . but courts have reasoned that there must be more than some mild 
distraction or curiosity created by the speech . . . but complete chaos is not 
required . . . . In determining the magnitude of the disruption . . . courts will 
consider factors such as: the reaction of the students and teachers to the speech, 
whether any students or teachers had to take time off from school because of the 
speech, whether teachers were incapable of controlling their classes because of 
the speech, whether classes were cancelled, and how quickly the administration 
responded to the speech . . . . If the court does find that the Internet speech 
actually disrupted or foreseeably could have disrupted the school’s learning 
environment, the administration’s disciplinary measures will most likely be 
upheld.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 71 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 72 Id. at 511 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). 
 73 See Id. at 509–10. 
 74 Id. at 511. 
 75 Id. at 508–10. 
 76 Id. at 508. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 514. 
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As mentioned earlier, the rules above could certainly apply to 
off-campus speech as well as online speech. Although there is 
some language in Tinker that may lead to the conclusion that the 
case controls only speech on school grounds,79 the authors found 
language, in various parts of the Tinker case, indicating that the 
rules from Tinker could govern any speech; thus encompassing 
both off-campus speech and online speech. For instance, the Court 
stated that the rules were “not confined to the supervised and 
ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom.” 80 
Additionally, the Court stated that “[a] student’s rights, therefore, 
do not embrace merely the classroom hours.”81 
                                                
 79 This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that each of the four cases that the 
Supreme Court has been presented involved a different context of student 
speech; and in each case, the Court created a different test. These cases are 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); and Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 
(2007). Consequently, it is inferable that the Court will establish a different test 
when confronted with its first off-campus student speech case or its first online 
student speech case. Moreover, one of the Court’s first statements to begin its 
analysis in Tinker specifically honed in on the on-campus focus: “Any word 
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the 
views of another person may start an argument or cause a disturbance . . . . But 
our Constitution says we must take this risk.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (emphasis 
added) (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)). The geographic 
locations identified in this contextual statement portend an on-campus scope for 
the subsequent analysis in the Tinker case. 
 80 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512. 
 81 Id. This statement, which potentially implies that the Court extended Tinker 
rules and reasoning far beyond the classroom and even beyond the schoolhouse 
gate, was however qualified by the immediate subsequent statement: “When he 
is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the 
authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects 
like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without ‘materially and substantially 
interfere[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of 
the school’ and without colliding with the rights of others.” Id. at 512–13 (citing 
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). This statement leaves one 
with the impression that the Supreme Court limited the Tinker rules and 
reasoning as well as the material and substantial disruption test to on-campus 
speech. 
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Still, other statements in the case suggest that Tinker 
encompasses all student speech. For example, the Supreme Court 
ruled that: 
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech.82 
The key phrase that implies an off-campus reach is “in class or 
out of it.”83 This phrase could mean outside the classroom but 
within the schoolhouse gate; or any geographic location beyond 
the classroom, including off-campus.84 Further, the Court stated 
that “we do not confine the permissible exercise of First 
Amendment rights . . . to supervised and ordained discussion in a 
school classroom,”85 implying an off-campus reach similar to the 
previous statement. Moreover, since online student speech often 
constitutes speech beyond the “supervised and ordained discussion 
in a school classroom,”86 the Court’s statement could be interpreted 
to mean that students have free speech rights in online forums. 
Nevertheless, what is clearly evident is that the Supreme Court did 
not expressly settle or even address whether Tinker governs off-
campus speech or online speech as those were not the facts of the 
case before the Court. As such, we are only left to interpret the 
Court’s, at times, inconsistent statements above. 
2. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
In Bethel, a student filed suit against the school district 
claiming that the district violated his First Amendment rights by 
disciplining him for using graphic sexual metaphors in a speech 
                                                
 82 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added). 
 83 Id. 
 84 See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837–38 
(N.D.Miss. 2012), aff’d in part rev’d in part by Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 
774 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2014) (interpreting the phrase to mean that “the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Tinker specifically ruled that off-campus conduct causing 
material or substantial disruption at school can be regulated by the school.”). 
 85 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 86 Id. 
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supporting a schoolmate’s candidacy for an elected office.87 The 
speech, delivered at a mandatory school assembly attended by 
about 600 fourteen-year old high school students, garnered 
reactions from some students who graphically simulated the sexual 
references in the speech while others loudly expressed derision or 
yelled.88 School officials suspended the student based on a school 
policy barring student use of obscene language.89 The United States 
District Court for the Western District of Washington as well as 
the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit held that the 
discipline violated the student’s free speech rights under the First 
Amendment, primarily because the speech did not cause material 
and substantial disruption at the school.90 The Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court decisions.91 
The Court explained that political speech—the form of speech 
in Tinker—must be treated differently from sexual speech.92 While 
political speech must be accorded the highest protection in schools 
in the absence of material and substantial disruption, sexual speech 
is readily subject to censorship because of the need for sensitivity 
to student sensibilities in schools.93 Further, while our democratic 
society encourages expression of divergent and controversial 
views, we place trust in schools to teach and develop students in 
the socially appropriate norms and decorum in expressing in such 
views.94 Consequently, even if vulgar and offensive language is 
uncensorable for adults, it can be censored for students particularly 
                                                
 87 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–79 (1986). 
 88 Id. at 678. The speech, which left some students startled, was delivered 
against the admonition of teachers. Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 680. 
 92 Id. at 680–81. 
 93 Id. at 680. 
 94 Id. at 681–83 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508) (“The inculcation of these 
values is truly the ‘work of the schools..’”); see also Id. at 684 (“[S]chools must 
teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order. Consciously or 
otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—demonstrate the 
appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and 
deportment ina ando out of class.”). 
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when they are in a school.95 The Court ruled that school officials 
can censor student speech that is lewd, plainly offensive, vulgar or 
obscene. 96  This is the Bethel test. 97  Applying this test to the 
student’s speech in the case, the Court ruled that school officials 
could censor the speech because its glorification of male sexuality 
was plainly offensive to teenage girls and lewd.98 
The context of this case indicates that the Bethel test and 
Court’s reasoning in the case only apply to on-campus speech. 
Specifically, the speech was delivered at a school assembly, which 
was an on-campus setting. Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that if the student “delivered the same speech in a 
public forum outside the school context, it would have been 
protected.”99 Therefore, applying the Bethel decision to an off-
campus context or an online context, neither of which was present 
in Bethel, might be taking the decision out of context.100 The Court 
seemed to emphasize an on-campus focus in stating that the 
“constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
                                                
 95 Id. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–342 (1985)) 
(“[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”). 
 96 Id. at 683–84. This is not only because of the school’s role as an institution 
of learning but also because of the youth and immaturity of students exposed to 
such language. Id. at 680. 
 97 It can also be referred to as the Fraser test – the other short form of the case 
name. 
 98 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 683–85. 
 99 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007). 
 100 Some language from the case indicates that the Court limited school 
officials’ authority to censor lewd, plainly offensive, vulgar or obscene student 
speech to on-campus settings. Accord J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. 
Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The School District’s argument fails at 
the outset because Fraser does not apply to off--campus speech. Specifically in 
Morse, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized that [h]ad 
Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it 
would have been protected.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Morse, 
551 U.S. at 405; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)). For instance, in 
justifying its decision to create the Bethel test, the Court declared that “[t]he 
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly 
is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.” Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 
478 U.S. at 683 (emphasis added). 
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automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings.” 101  This language suggests that students have 
constitutional rights that are coextensive with those of adults in 
settings beyond the public school.102 Further language in the case 
could imply that schools have authority to censor students’ off-
campus speech. For example, the Court declared that 
“[c]onsciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older 
students—demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and 
political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of 
class.”103 The “in and out of class” reference could either mean in 
and out of class on school grounds; or it could refer to any place 
outside the class, which would encompass off-campus locales. 
Additionally, the Court stated “it is a highly appropriate function 
of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and 
offensive terms in public discourse.” 104  This authorization of 
censorship over student public discourse was not explicitly 
restricted to on-campus discourse; nor was it restricted to offline 
speech. Thus, the authorization could be interpreted to include off-
campus and online discourse. 
However, it would be fantastic to imagine that the Court 
granted unbridled school authority over student public discourse 
irrespective of location and connection to the school. After all, the 
Court ruled in Tinker, “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute 
                                                
 101 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added) (citing New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–42). 
 102 See J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 932 (“Specifically in Morse, Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized that [h]ad Fraser delivered 
the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have 
beenp protected. The Court’s citation to the Cohen decision is noteworthy. The 
Supreme Court in Cohen held, in a non-school setting, that a state may not make 
a single four-letter expletive a criminal offense . . . Accordingly, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s reliance on the Cohen decision reaffirms that a student’s free speech 
rights outside the school context are coextensive with the rights of an adult.” 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). See also J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 
650 F.3d at 932 (“Fraser’s ‘lewdness’ standard cannot be extended to justify a 
school’s punishment . . . for use of profane language outside the school, during 
non--school hours.”). 
 103 Bethel. Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 683 (emphasis added). 
 104 Id. 
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authority over their students.”105 Therefore, even if Bethel applies 
to off-campus speech106 courts must require a significant nexus to 
the campus in order to avoid convoluting the distinction between 
off-campus and on-campus speech. As for online speech, the only 
reason not to extend Bethel to such speech is the context of Bethel: 
Bethel involved offline speech. Even though the context of Bethel 
was offline speech, the language of Bethel nevertheless suggests 
that the decision could be interpreted as applicable to online 
speech. This is, for instance, evident in the Court’s declaration that 
“[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or 
in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school 
board.”107 In this statement, there is no distinction between online 
speech and offline speech. In all, from our discussions above, one 
could surmise that Bethel applies online and offline but not off-
campus. However, of the Supreme Court’s quartet of cases, 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 108 , discussed next, 
provides the clearest limitation of school censorship authority to 
the confines of the campus and thus on-campus speech. 
3. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
In Hazelwood, student staff members of a newspaper, 
published as part of a journalism class, sued their school district 
alleging that school officials’ censorship of two articles in the 
paper violated their First Amendment free speech rights.109 One of 
the articles addressed the effect of divorce on students while the 
other detailed three students’ experiences with pregnancy.110 The 
officials reasoned that the articles compromised the confidentiality 
and identities of the students and family members covered.111 The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri 
                                                
 105 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 
(1969). 
 106 As evident above, on the whole, Bethel does not appear to apply to off-
campus speech, however. 
 107 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 478 U.S. at 683. 
 108 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 109 Id. at 262, 264. 
 110 Id. at 263. 
 111 Id. at 262–63. 
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refused to enjoin the censorship because the newspaper was part of 
a class.112 The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit 
reversed, ruling that the articles could not be censored unless 
school officials satisfied the material and substantial disruption 
test.113 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if school 
officials could censor student speech in school publications 
without violating the First Amendment.114 
The Supreme Court ruled that school officials may censor 
school-sponsored student speech—student speech that the public 
might reasonably view to bear the school’s imprimatur. School 
officials can censor such speech as long as they can show that the 
censorship was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical 
concern.115 This is the Hazelwood test. Under this test, school 
officials can censor school-sponsored speech to ensure that 
students learn the curriculum, to protect students’ emotional 
maturity, and to address students’ grammatical errors, bias, or 
profanity.116 The Court ruled that, since the newspaper was part of 
a class and had not been opened to indiscriminate use, it was a 
closed public forum and as such school-sponsored speech that the 
school could censor.117 
While the medium for the speech in the Hazelwood case was a 
hard copy newspaper (as opposed to the Internet), the medium did 
not play a dispositive role in the Court’s decision. Further, since 
schools can sponsor speech online or offline (e.g., the newspaper 
in Hazelwood), the Hazelwood test, which governs school-
sponsored speech, should extend online even though it does not 
extend off-campus. 
While the context of Hazelwood clearly suggests it only has 
on-campus reach, the Court also prominently stated that “[a] 
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 
                                                
 112 Id. at 264–65. 
 113 Id. at 262–63. 
 114 Id. at 266. 
 115 Id. at 271, 273. 
 116 Id. at 272. 
 117 Id. at 267. 
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‘basic educational mission,’ even though the government could not 
censor similar speech outside the school.” 118  This statement 
suggests that school officials do not have unbridled power over 
students outside the schoolhouse gate. Per contra, since the school-
sponsored nature of speech was the dispositive factor in 
Hazelwood, and school-sponsorship of speech is borderless, 
presumably the Hazelwood test could be stretched for an off-
campus reach.119 Indeed, in Morse v. Frederick,120 discussed next, 
the Court affirmed this limited reach in stating “Kuhlmeier 
acknowledged that schools may regulate some speech even though 
the government could not censor similar speech outside the 
school.”121 
4. Morse v. Frederick 
This was the last student-speech case decided by the Supreme 
Court.122 As in the prior cases, the speech occurred offline.123 
However, unlike the prior cases, which literally occurred on school 
grounds, the speech in Morse occurred outside the confines of 
school grounds.124 
In Morse, a student filed a First Amendment claim against the 
school district alleging a violation of his right to free speech after 
he was suspended, pursuant to the school’s policy against 
advocacy of illegal substances, for unfurling a banner which read 
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” as the Olympic Torch Relay proceeded 
on the street in front of his school.125 The school also rationalized 
                                                
 118 Id. at 266 (emphasis added) (citing Bethel School District No. 403, 478 
U.S. at 685). 
 119 Beyond these observations, there is no indication in the case that the Court 
intended for the test to apply off-campus. 
 120 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 121 Id. at 405–06 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122 See id. 
 123 See generally Id. 
 124 Id. at 396. 
 125 Id. at 397–99. School officials approved the commercially-sponsored (as 
opposed to school-sponsored) event as a class trip though students were under 
no obligation to attend the event. The event was neither funded nor coordinated 
by the school. Id. 
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the discipline as punishment for unfurling the banner at a school-
sanctioned event during school hours.126 At the time, the student 
was standing outside school grounds on the public sidewalk across 
the street from the school.127 Indeed, the principal had to cross the 
street onto the public sidewalk to confront the student.128 Despite 
the fact that the event was not mandatory, school officials 
monitored students in attendance.129 The United States District 
Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment, 
finding no First Amendment infringement.130 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that 
school officials failed to satisfy the material and substantial 
disruption test.131 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider 
whether the First Amendment protected the student’s banner.132 
The Supreme Court chose to create a new test for determining 
when school officials can censor student speech.133 This test, the 
Morse test, provides that school officials can censor student speech 
                                                
 126 Id. at 398; see also id. at 398–99 (“The common sense understanding of 
the phrase ‘bong hits’ is that it is a reference to a means of smoking marijuana. 
Given [Frederick’s] inability or unwillingness to express any other credible 
meaning for the phrase, I, I can only agree with the principal and countless 
others who saw the banner as advocating the use of illegal drugs. [Frederick’s] 
speech was not political. He was not advocating the legalization of marijuana or 
promoting a religious belief. He was displaying a fairly silly message promoting 
illegal drug usage in the midst of a school activity, for the benefit of television 
cameras covering the Torch Relay. [Frederick’s] speech was potentially 
disruptive to the event and clearly disruptive of and inconsistent with the 
school’s educational mission to educate students about the dangers of illegal 
drugs and to discourage their use.”). 
 127 Id. at 397-99. In fact, the student with the banner was late that day and did 
not enter the school’s physical premises; instead he went straight across the 
street from the school. Id.; Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1115-17 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 128 Morse, 551 U.S. at 397. 
 129 Id. at 397–98. 
 130 Id. at 399. 
 131 Id. at 399–400. 
 132 Id. at 400, 403. 
 133 Id. at 404–06. The Court also found the prior tests—Tinker, Bethel and 
Hazelwood—insufficient for addressing the gravity of drug threats to students. 
Id. at 408–09. 
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that advocates illegal drug use.134 The Court reasoned that drugs 
present such great danger to students that speech advocating their 
use cannot be tolerated in schools.135 Accordingly, school officials 
can take steps to deter a student culture of drug abuse by censoring 
advocacy of drugs.136 Even when the speaker does not intend to 
advocate illegal drug use through the speech, school officials can 
censor the speech if they reasonably interpret it to advocate illegal 
drug use.137 
The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that this case was 
an off-campus speech case because it occurred outside school 
grounds.138 The Court explained that the speech was delivered at a 
school-sanctioned event that took place during school hours.139 
Moreover, the supervisory presence of school officials, as well as 
the presence of other students, brought the location across the 
street within the ambit of the schoolhouse gate. 140 The Court 
declared that a student “cannot stand in the midst of his fellow 
students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and 
claim he is not at school.”141 Beyond the supervisory and student 
presence requirements, however, the Court failed to define what 
process schools must follow in order to sanction an event for 
purposes of the First Amendment. Conceivably, schools can 
sanction events post-hoc in order to justify censorship of off-
campus student speech—a dangerous proposition.142 Despite this 
                                                
 134 Id. at 408. 
 135 Id. at 407. 
 136 Id. at 407.  
 137 Id. at 401, 408. 
 138 Id. at 400–01. 
 139 Id. at 401. 
 140 Id. at 400–01. 
 141 Id. at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court effectively 
empowered schools to sanction events that they do not sponsor if they want to 
extend their censorship beyond the schoolhouse gate. Thus non-school-
sponsored speech can still be censored at school-sanctioned events that occur 
even off-campus. 
 142 This is a dangerous proposition since it is in effect a grant of unwieldy 
power to schools to censor student speech through manipulation of the 
sanctioned nature of events. 
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grant of expansive school power, the Court acknowledged that 
there is incertitude in the scope of its student-speech precedents.143 
Thus, there is no certainty that the precedents apply to off-campus 
speech.144 Further, “the very fact that the Supreme Court created a 
new basis for restriction of student speech – rather than trying to 
shoehorn the [Morse] case into Tinker, Fraser, or Hazelwood . . . 
suggests that other . . . [tests] may subsequently be recognized as 
well.”145 
VI. VIRTUAL SPEECH AMIDST THE AMBIVALENCE IN THE 
STUDENT-SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE 
The earlier discussion of the United States Supreme Court’s 
student-speech precedents reveals that the Court has yet to review 
a case involving virtual student speech.146 The Court’s silence has 
fueled the uncertainty of both administrators and school officials 
regarding how to handle virtual student speech. Lower courts have 
likewise struggled to determine which of the student-speech tests 
should govern virtual student speech.147 Indeed, the law has failed 
                                                
 143 Morse, 551 U.S. at 401. Recall, the Supreme Court’s student-speech 
precedents factually only involved on-campus speech. 
 144 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 
494 F.3d 34, 39, n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Since the Supreme Court in Morse rejected 
the claim that the student’s location, standing across the street from the school at 
a school approved event with a banner visible to most students,, was not ‘at 
school,’ it had no occasion to consider the circumstances under which school 
authorities may discipline students for off--campus activities.” (internal citations 
omitted)). See also D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 761 
(8th Cir. 2011) (“In none of these cases [Tinker, Bethel, Hazelwood and Morse] 
was the Court faced with a situation where the First Amendment question arose 
from school discipline . . . for conduct outside of school.”). 
 145 Emily G. Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students’ Potentially 
Hurtful Speech (Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 489 (2008). 
 146 See supra Part V. 
 147 See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green, III, Censorship and Student 
Communication in Online and Offline Settings (2015) (extensively discussing 
lower courts’ struggles), available at http://www.igi-global.com/book/censorship- 
student-communication-online-offline/134799 (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
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to catch up with technology. 148  Nonetheless, according to the 
Supreme Court, it is indisputable that the First Amendment applies 
to virtual speech.149 
In the cases that have reviewed virtual student speech, Tinker’s 
material and substantial disruption test has emerged as the favorite 
test.150 Courts use the material and substatial disruption test as the 
default test when resolving virtual student speech cases because 
such cases do not precisely fit the factual contexts of the Supreme 
Court’s student-speech precedents. 151  Rather than investigating 
whether the Supreme Court intended the material and substantial 
disruption test to apply to off-campus speech, some courts simply 
assume its applicability. 152  When courts choose to apply the 
material and substantial disruption test, they are more likely to find 
school censorship of student speech unconstitutional because of the 
requirement to prove substantial disruption.153 
                                                
 148 Christopher E. Roberts, Is Myspace Their Space?: Protecting Student 
Cyberspeech In A Post-Morse v. Frederick World, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1177, 
1181 (2008). 
 149 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
 150 LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988– 89 (9th Cir. 2001); O.Z. v. 
Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08–5671 ODW, 2008 WL 
4396895, 4 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 9, 2008); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 
F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. 
Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000); accord Douglas D. Frederick, 
Restricting Student Speech That Invades Others’ Rights: A Novel Interpretation 
Of Student Speech Jurisprudence In Harper v. Poway Unified School District, 
29 U. HAW. L. REV. 479, 487 (2007). 
 151 Accord J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 301 
(3d Cir. 2010); Boucher v. School Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 
827–28 (7th Cir. 1998); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 
970 (5th Cir.1972); T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 
F.Supp.2d 767, 781 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 152 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 926. 
 153 Frederick, supra note 150 at 497. See also Leora Harpaz, Internet Speech 
And The First Amendment Rights Of Public School Students, 2000 B.Y.U. 
EDUC. & L.J. 123, 128 (2000) (characterizing the substantial-disruption 
requirement as a “significant burden”). 
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The first lower court case to rule on the virtual speech rights of 
students was Beussink v. Woodland R-IV School District.154 In that 
case, a student was disciplined for creating a website that used 
vulgar and boorish language to criticize his principal, teachers, and 
the school’s website.155 The student challenged the discipline as a 
violation of his First Amendment rights.156 The website solicited 
readers to send their critical comments about the school to the 
principal. 157  The website was created on the student’s home 
computer, outside school hours, and without using school 
resources.158 The student’s website included a hyperlink to the 
school’s website; however, the student did not intend for anyone at 
the school to see his website.159 
No one accessed the website at the school until the student’s 
friend reported the website to a teacher.160 The friend discovered 
the website while using the student’s personal computer at the 
student’s home.161 The student neither authorized nor knew of his 
friend’s access of the website.162 Furthermore, the website caused 
no disruption at the school.163 
The student, unclear about his free speech rights, approached 
the school’s civics teacher to inquire about whether he could be 
disciplined for his speech.164 The teacher’s response exemplifies 
the typical confusion of school officials regarding the scope of 
students’ First Amendment rights; she simply stated that “she did 
not know.”165 The federal district court, however, tried to bring 
clarity to the jurisprudence. Specifically, the court decided that the 
material and substantial disruption test should govern online 
                                                
 154 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
 155 Id. at 1177. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 1177–78. 
 162 Id. at 1178. 
 163 Id. at 1179–80. 
 164 Id. at 1179. 
 165 Id. 
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speech since the other tests in existence at the time, the Bethel and 
Hazelwood tests, did not contextually fit this virtual speech case.166 
The court found that upset feelings and disapproval of the 
website’s content, rather than material and substantial disruption, 
motivated the suspension.167 Consequently, school officials had no 
authority to censor the speech.168 
The court failed to provide a rationale for extending judicial 
authority into the realm of off-campus speech other than ruling that 
the material and substantial disruption test is the default test when 
no other test is applicable to student speech. A review of the 
decision, however, suggests that the court likely found the 
following connections between the speech and the school 
paramount and sufficient to create a nexus justifying application of 
the material and substantial disruption test to off-campus speech: 
(1) the website criticized school officials; (2) the website was 
hyperlinked to the school website; (3) and the website was 
accessed at school by the student’s friend and school officials.169 
The court relied on these weak connections, rather than requiring 
that the speaker actually bring the off-campus speech to school or 
affirmatively facilitate its on-campus presence. In essence, while 
courts may choose to apply the material and substantial disruption 
test to off-campus speech, they may also rely on weak connections 
between off-campus speech and the campus in order to bring the 
off-campus speech within the Supreme Court’s student-speech 
precedents. 
A. Distinguishing On-Campus from Off-Campus Virtual Speech 
With the advancement of technology, we are likely to continue 
to see students capitalize on technology to find ample opportunities 
                                                
 166 Id. at 1180, n. 4 (showing the court chose the material and substantial 
disruption test despite acknowledging that the Supreme Court has varied its First 
Amendment student-speech jurisprudence based on the form of the student 
speech). 
 167 Id. at 1180–81. 
 168 Id. at 1180–82. 
 169 Harpaz, supra note 153, at 148. 
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to misbehave.170 School officials driven to regulate the student 
behavior are faced with the challenge of determining whether they 
can censor off-campus speech. Research shows that school 
officials are more inclined to punish off-campus speech that 
criticizes school officials as opposed to speech expressing a 
political or other viewpoint off-campus.171 This shows that school 
officials censoring students tend to be thin-skinned. 
On-campus speech clearly falls within the Supreme Court’s 
student-speech precedents; thus, such speech is readily subject to 
censorship pursuant to the quartet of student-speech tests.172 As 
discussed previously, the lack of Supreme Court precedent on off-
campus student speech leaves school officials in a gray area as to 
whether they can regulate off-campus speech.173 In virtual schools, 
it is difficult to determine what constitutes off-campus speech 
versus on-campus speech. The ubiquity of the Internet makes the 
distinction between on-campus speech and off-campus speech 
elusive.174 This elusiveness could make it difficult for courts and 
school officials to determine when to apply the Supreme Court’s 
                                                
 170 See generally Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No.415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272 
(W.D. Wash. 2007); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 
61 (2009). See also Pisciotta, supra note 55, at 661–62 (“The Internet, however, 
has also presented students with an unprecedented opportunity to candidly 
ridicule their schools and teachers.”). 
 171 Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline For Creating Uncensored 
Anonymous Internet Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 161 (2003). 
 172  See generally Oluwole & Green, supra note 147, at 62–121 (2015) 
(extensively discussing lower courts’ struggles), available at http://www.igi-
global.com/book/censorship-student-communication-online-offline/134799 (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
 173 See supra Section V.  
 174 This is particularly so because of the far-reaching scope of the internet that 
makes it difficult to define geographical boundaries of speech. As the Supreme 
Court observed, “[t]his dynamic, multifaceted category of communication 
includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and 
still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat 
rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, 
mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a 
pamphleteer.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 870. 
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student-speech precedents.175 Judge Jordan of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit described this challenge 
adeptly: 
[f]or better or worse, wireless internet access, smart phones, tablet 
computers, social networking services like Facebook, and stream-of-
consciousness communications via Twitter give an omnipresence to 
speech that makes any effort to trace First Amendment boundaries 
along the physical boundaries of a school campus a recipe for serious 
problems in our public schools.176 
In virtual schools, the campus could include the school-
provided laptop, Internet access, server, and the learning 
management system, as well as the video and audio system used 
for class sessions. As such, off-campus will be areas outside these 
examples. What constitutes virtual off-campus could also change 
temporally. In other words, during the hours of using a school 
laptop (or other school technology resource) for educational 
purposes, the student will be on-campus. Outside those times, the 
student would be deemed off-campus. 
Unfortunately, there is a very sparse jurisprudence on the 
distinction between virtual off-campus and on-campus speech.177 
One case that has considered this distinction is Requa v. Kent 
School District No. 415.178 The student in that case, in concert with 
classmates, allegedly recorded his teacher twice, furtively, and 
posted the video on YouTube.179 He also included a link to the 
YouTube video on his personal MySpace webpage. 180  The 
                                                
 175 See, e.g., D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (“The widespread use of instant messaging by students in and out of 
school presents new First Amendment challenges for school officials. Instant 
messaging enables student messages to be rapidly communicated widely in 
school and out. School officials cannot constitutionally reach out to discover, 
monitor, or punish any type of out of school speech.”). 
 176 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 
2011) (Jordan, J., concurring). 
 177 J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002). 
 178 Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No.415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1272 (W.D. 
Wash. 2007).  
 179 Id. at 1274. We use “allegedly” because the court found that there was 
dispute as to the student’s level of involvement in the recording. Id. at 1274–75. 
 180 Id. at 1274. 
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recording included critical comments about the teacher’s 
hygiene.181 It also showed a student thrusting his pelvic toward the 
teacher while holding two fingers above the back of the teacher’s 
head (rabbit ears).182 
A section of the video, preceded by the warning “Caution 
Booty Ahead” (and accompanied by a song titled “Ms. New 
Booty”), showed several shots of the teacher’s buttocks while 
bending over or walking.183 While the filming occurred on campus 
during school hours, the editing and YouTube posting occurred 
off-campus after school hours.184 The school computers blocked 
access to YouTube, so no student accessed the video on a school 
computer.185 However, a local television station found the video 
while researching a news story on students’ use of YouTube to 
criticize teachers and informed the school.186 School officials chose 
to suspend the student even though the video caused no actual 
disruption at the school.187 The student filed a First Amendment 
claim against the school district challenging the discipline for his 
speech.188 
School officials contended, and the court agreed, that the 
student was disciplined for his on-campus filming rather than the 
off-campus video editing and YouTube posting. 189  The court 
reasoned that school officials did not require the student to remove 
the YouTube link from his MySpace page; nor did they bar the 
student from re-posting the link after the student voluntarily 
removed it.190 Furthermore, school officials did not discipline other 
students who posted a link to the YouTube video on their MySpace 
                                                
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 1274, 1279. 
 183 Id. at 1274. 
 184 Id. at 1275–76. 
 185 Id. at 1274. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 1274–75. The student served his suspension in contract school, an 
interim placement where a student works on school assignments from home 
with aid of a tutor. Id. at 1276. 
 188 Id. at 1275–76. 
 189 Id. at 1275. 
 190 Id. at 1278. 
DEC. 2015] Virtual Schools, Student Rights 255 
pages. 191  In other words, school officials only disciplined the 
student for his on-campus speech. By isolating the on-campus 
filming from the off-campus expressive actions of the student, the 
court was able to avoid confronting the uncertainty in the scope of 
the Supreme Court’s student-speech precedents. 
In essence, if school officials can limit their discipline to the 
on-campus portion of a student’s expression, then any pertinent 
test among the four student-speech tests will be readily applicable 
to the speech. In this particular case, the court chose to apply the 
Bethel test as well as the material and substantial disruption test.192 
The court determined that the filming of the pelvic thrust, the 
teacher’s buttocks, and the rabbit ears, as well as the “Caution 
Booty Ahead” graphic and the song, constituted lewd and plainly 
offensive speech under the Bethel test.193 Therefore, the speech was 
censorable. 194  The court reached this conclusion despite 
acknowledging that “[t]he facts of this case are not on all fours 
with Fraser in the sense that the ‘speech’ at issue here was 
ultimately published in an off-campus forum (i.e., the Internet).”195 
To rationalize its decision, the court underscored the fact that 
school officials successfully isolated the on-campus speech from 
the off-campus speech: 
[b]ut an inseparable part of the speech which Plaintiff seeks to protect 
is the filming of the footage in the classroom. That is an inextricable 
part of the activity which comprises the “speech” of the completed 
video and, in singling out that discreet portion of the “speech” for 
punishment, Defendants have localized the sanctionable behavior to the 
area in which their authority has been upheld by the Supreme Court.196 
The court concluded that school officials could also discipline 
the student under the material and substantial disruption test, even 
though the video caused no actual disruption at the school.197 The 
court explained that the filming of a teacher’s buttocks, rabbit ears, 
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 192 Id. at 1279–81. 
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and pelvic thrust was a demeaning, sexually suggestive action; 
accordingly, it constituted a per se disruption of the school’s 
culture of respect among teachers and students.198 The court chose 
to apply the material and substantial disruption test because it is 
the “catch-all” test when other student speech cases do not neatly 
fit the case under consideration.199 As long as the Supreme Court 
fails to rule on which test should govern off-campus speech, the 
inclination toward the material and substantial disruption test will 
continue.200 
It appears that if virtual schools can separate the on-campus 
components of speech from the off-campus components, they will 
have an easier constitutional route to censorship under one of the 
student-speech tests. If the off-campus and on-campus speech 
components are inseparable, courts are less likely to sanction 
censorship unless the speech has some connection to the campus. 
When off-campus speech has a cognizable connection to the 
campus (such as where off-campus virtual speech is brought on 
campus), courts will be inclined to bring the speech within the 
ambit of the Supreme Court’s student-speech precedents. 
B. Off-Campus Virtual Speech Brought On Campus 
Sometimes courts have to determine whether speech occurring 
outside the schoolhouse gate, but with an effect on campus, 
constitutes on-campus speech or off-campus speech. This was the 
issue in J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District.201 
In this case, while off-campus at a local restaurant, a student 
recorded her friends calling a classmate a “slut,” “spoiled,” and 
“the ugliest piece of shit I’ve ever seen in my whole life.”202 One of 
the friends also accused the classmate of speaking about 
                                                
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3rd Cir. 
2001)). 
 200 J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1102–03 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 201 Id. at 1100. 
 202 Id. at 1098. 
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“boners.”203 As the student recorded the scene, she could be heard 
cheering on the off-color comments.204 She posted the video on 
YouTube using her personal computer. 205  She then informed 
several students and the classmate targeted in the video of the 
YouTube link.206 The classmate, who was very upset about the 
video and had to undergo counseling, reported the video to school 
officials.207 The school blocked student access to YouTube and 
other social networking site so only school officials watched the 
video on campus. 208  Nonetheless, school officials required the 
student to delete the video from both YouTube and her personal 
computer.209 She was also suspended for two days.210 Consequently, 
she filed a First Amendment claim against the school district 
challenging the discipline.211 The court had to “determine the scope 
of a school’s authority to regulate speech by its students that 
occurs off campus but has an effect on campus.”212 In this case, the 
on-campus effects of the off-campus speech included: (1) the 
school visit by the upset parent of the targeted student to complain 
about the speech; (2) the counseling for the targeted student; and 
(3) the student’s temporary refusal to go into his classroom.213 
The court observed that “many other courts analyzing off-
campus speech that subsequently is brought to campus or to the 
attention of school authorities apply the substantial disruption test 
from Tinker without regard to the location where the speech 
originated (off campus or on campus).”214 Indeed, the court noted 
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 204 Id. 
 205 Id.  
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. at 1099. 
 209 Id. at 1099–1100. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 1100. 
 212 Id. at 1098. 
 213 Id. at 1117. 
 214 Id. at 1103. In other words, a number of courts see the material and 
substantial disruption test as borderless; and are willing to disregard the on-
campus context of Tinker. See id. at 1104 (“In these cases, the courts have 	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“the substantial weight of authority indicates that geographic 
boundaries generally carry little weight in the student-speech 
analysis.”215 If geographical boundaries are discounted, then the 
lack of Supreme Court precedent on off-campus speech, or virtual 
speech, becomes highly insignificant or even immaterial in 
student-speech cases.216 Accordingly, the court chose to apply the 
material and substantial disruption test to the YouTube video.217 
However, the court found no evidence of substantial disruption at 
the school; instead, the court noted the effects of the speech at the 
school such as the upset parent of the target student, the 
counseling, and temporary refusal by the targeted student to enter 
the classroom were de minimis.218 Moreover, the court ruled that 
the need to guard students’ emotional maturity from criticisms 
does not satisfy the material and substantial disruption test: 
Indeed, no one could seriously challenge that thirteen-year-olds often 
say mean-spirited things about one another, or that a teenager likely 
will weather a verbal attack less ably than an adult. The Court accepts 
that C.C. was upset, even hysterical, about the YouTube video, and that 
the School’s only goal was to console C.C. and to resolve the situation 
as quickly as possible. Unfortunately for the School, good intentions do 
not suffice here. Defendants have failed to present sufficient evidence 
that the YouTube video caused a substantial disruption to school 
activity on May 28, 2008. Further, Defendants’ fear that a substantial 
disruption was likely to occur simply is not supported by the facts.219 
Looking beyond the material and substantial disruption test, the 
court concluded that the Bethel test was inapplicable because that 
                                                                                                         
directly applied the Tinker substantial disruption test to determine if a First 
Amendment violation occurred, without first considering the geographic origin 
of the speech.”). 
 215 Id. at 1104. 
 216 Id. at 1107. 
 217 Id. at 1109; see also id. at 1110 (“[T]he Court finds that the YouTube 
video clearly falls into the ‘all other speech’ category, governed by Tinker.”). 
 218 Id. at 1117–22; see id. at 1119 (“For the Tinker test to have any reasonable 
limits, the word ‘substantial’ must equate to something more than the ordinary 
personality conflicts among middle school students that may leave one student 
feeling hurt or insecure.”). 
 219 Id. at 1122. 
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test is “limited to speech that occurs in school.”220 Moreover, the 
court was “not aware of any authority from the circuit courts 
applying Fraser to speech that takes place off campus.”221 The 
Morse test was not applicable because the YouTube video did not 
advocate illegal drug use; and the Hazelwood test was inapplicable 
because the speech was not school-sponsored.222 
The court emphasized that school officials must not “become 
censors of students’ speech at all times, in all places, and under all 
circumstances.”223 If it is established that a student had no intention 
of bringing off-campus speech to the campus, or the student takes 
steps to ensure that the speech does not get to the campus, the 
Supreme Court student-speech precedents would be inapplicable to 
the off-campus speech.224 
C. Location As Context and the Nexus Requirement for Virtual 
Speech 
Despite the fact that a number of courts insist on ignoring the 
on-campus context of the Supreme Court’s precedents when 
applying those precedents to off-campus speech, some courts 
                                                
 220 Id. at 1109; see Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 
2010) (finding the context of online speech distinct from a school assembly in 
Bethel and noting that “[f]or the Court to equate a school assembly to the entire 
internet would set a precedent too far reaching”). See also Scott A. Moss, The 
Overhyped Path From Tinker To Morse: How The Student Speech Cases Show 
The Limits Of Supreme Court Decisions—For The Law And For The Litigants, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 1407, 1446 (2011) (describing the distinction between the 
captive audience of Bethel and the internet which generally involves students 
accessing and then voluntarily navigating in order to be exposed to content). 
 221 J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F.Supp.2d 1094, 
1110 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Moreover, the reasoning of Fraser, which is anchored 
in the school’s duty to teach norms of civility to its students, does not support 
extending Fraser to lewd or offensive speech occurring off campus. For these 
reasons, the Court will not apply Fraser to Plaintiff’s YouTube video.”). 
 222 Id. at 1109. 
 223 Id. at 1110, n.8 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 
607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
 224 Id. at 1098, 1107–09 (stating the student in this case did not meet this 
standard, however, since she told other students of the video and asked them to 
watch it on YouTube). 
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consider the context critical. 225  These courts require that the 
location of the speech must be a threshold determination before 
deciding applicability of the Supreme Court’s student-speech 
precedents.226 These cases tend to extend the precedents to off-
campus speech only if it has a nexus to the school.227 Wisniewski v. 
Board of Education of the Weedsport Central School District228 is a 
prime example. The student in the case used a firing pistol as his 
AOL Instant Messaging (IM) identifier icon when communicating 
from his home computer.229 The pistol was directed at a human 
head that had dots signifying blood splatter above it. 230  The 
following phrase, targeting the student’s English teacher, appeared 
below the head: “Kill Mr. VanderMolen.”231 This icon was visible, 
for at least three weeks, during IM exchanges with about fifteen 
people on the student’s buddy list, which included some 
classmates.232 A student who was not on the list reported the icon 
to the English teacher who in turn informed school 
administrators.233 The student-speaker was first suspended for five 
days and then for one semester.234 School officials granted the 
distressed teacher’s request to no longer teach the student.235 The 
student filed suit against the school district claiming that the 
discipline for his speech violated his First Amendment right to free 
                                                
 225 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 931 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 226 J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1104 (C.D. Cal. 2010). See Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (S.D. 
Fla. 2010) (“Where the speech occurs should be determined at the outset in 
order to decide whether the ‘unique concerns’ of the school environment are 
implicated.”). 
 227 See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
 228 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.2007). 
 229 Id. at 35. 
 230 Id. at 36. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. at 36, 39. The buddy list is a group of people that a message sender on 
IM chooses to communicate with in real time. 
 233 Id. at 36. 
 234 Id. at 36–37. A police investigation and a psychologist evaluation revealed 
that the student meant the icon as a joke. Id. at 36. 
 235 Id. at 36. 
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speech.236 The district court ruled for the school district and the 
student appealed.237 
Although the court of appeals acknowledged a distinction 
between off-campus speech and on-campus speech, it ruled that the 
material and substantial disruption test can be extended to off-
campus speech if the speech has a nexus to the school.238 That 
nexus is established when the speech is reasonably foreseeable to 
come to the attention of school officials.239 The court reasoned that 
it would be unwise to wholly foreclose school censorship of off-
campus speech because, in some instances, such speech could 
“create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a 
school.”240 The court chose the material and substantial disruption 
test as the governing test for determining the constitutionality of 
school censorship of off-campus virtual speech because, of the 
student-speech tests, the material and substantial disruption test is 
the only one that embodies a nexus.241 
Another case that recognized a distinction between off-campus 
and on-campus speech and imposed a nexus requirement is 
Doninger v. Niehoff.242 In this case, a student council member, in 
concert with other students, sent out mass emails to community 
members asking them to intervene in the scheduling of an annual 
band concert.243 The students objected to school officials’ plans to 
move the location of the event, a change that could have threatened 
the scheduled date of the event.244 As a result of the mass emails, 
school officials received a flood of emails and calls supporting the 
students.245 The student council member posted the following on a 
                                                
 236 Id. at 37.  
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. at 39. 
 239 Id.; D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766–67 (8th 
Cir. 2011). 
 240 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 243 Id. at 44–45. 
 244 Id. at 44. 
 245 Id. 
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publicly-accessible blog, after school hours, using her personal 
computer: 
Jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. here is an 
email that we sent to a ton of people and asked them to forward to 
everyone in their address book to help get support for jamfest. 
Basically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is getting a TON of 
phone calls and emails and such. we have so much support and we 
really appreciate it. however, she got pissed off and decided to just 
cancel the whole thing all together. anddd so basically we aren’t going 
to have it at all, but in the slightest chance we do it is going to be after 
the talent show on may 18th. anddhere is the letter we sent out to 
parents.246 
The student also posted a copy of the mass email on the public 
blog.247 School officials were displeased at the misleading and 
vulgar nature of the blog and disciplined the student.248 The student 
filed a First Amendment claim against the school district.249 The 
district court ruled for the school district and the student 
appealed.250 
The court of appeals acknowledged that the emergence of 
virtual student speech has made geographical location elusive.251 
Nonetheless, geographical location is important; for as the court 
noted, had the student used language such as “douchebags” on 
campus, school officials could have readily censored the speech 
under the Bethel test.252 The court, however, refused to resolve 
                                                
 246 Id. at 45. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. at 45–46. It was misleading to claim that the event had been canceled as 
this is completely false. Id. at 51. The principal asked the student to write an 
apology letter, show her mother the blog and withdraw from the Senior Class 
Secretary election. Id. at 46. The student complied with these disciplinary 
sanctions with the exception of the candidacy withdrawal. Even though school 
officials prevented her name from getting on the ballot, she got a plurality of the 
votes. Despite her election, school officials did not allow her to assume the 
Senior Class Secretary position. Id. 
 249 Id. at 47. 
 250 Id. at 43. 
 251 Id. at 48–49. 
 252 Id. at 49 (The Bethel test (also known as the Fraser test) empowers school 
officials to censor plainly offensive, lewd, vulgar and obscene student speech.). 
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whether the Bethel test could be extended to off-campus speech.253 
Instead, the court viewed the material and substantial disruption 
test as the established test for off-campus speech with a caveat.254 
Specifically, the court ruled that a nexus is created to allow 
censorship under the test if off-campus speech is reasonably 
foreseeable to reach the campus.255 Further, a nexus is created if the 
speech is reasonably foreseeable to cause substantial disruption on 
campus. 256  The blog posting satisfied the requisite nexus 
requirements as the posting showed that the student intended to stir 
up community members to call and email the school.257 The blog 
also included misleading and vulgar language designed to rile 
people to oppose school officials, potentially undermining the 
good faith efforts of school officials for an amicable solution.258 
Consequently, a nexus was established.259 
Also in J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District,260 the court 
made analysis of speech location a threshold requirement in 
student-speech cases; and required a nexus between off-campus 
speech and the campus before extending the Supreme Court’s 
precedents to off-campus speech.261 In J.S., a student created a 
                                                
 253 Id. at 50 (“We need not decide whether other standards [besides the 
material and substantial disruption test] may apply when considering the extent 
to which a school may discipline off-campus speech.”); see also id. at 49 (“It is 
not clear, however, that Fraser applies to off-campus speech.”). 
 254  Id. at 50. As discussed earlier herein, the material and substantial 
disruption test is the Tinker test. 
 255 Id. at 50–51, see also S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. 
Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing D.J.M., 647 F.3d at 766) 
(“Tinker applies to off-campus student speech where it is reasonably foreseeable 
that the speech will reach the school community and cause a substantial 
disruption to the educational setting.”). 
 256 Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50. 
 257 Id. at 50–51. 
 258 Id.; see also id. at 51–52 (stating that the student’s “conduct posed a 
substantial risk that LMHS administrators and teachers would be further 
diverted from their core educational responsibilities by the need to dissipate 
misguided anger or confusion over Jamfest’s purported cancellation.”). 
 259 Id. at 51–52. 
 260 J.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
 261 Id. 
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website called “Teacher Sux” that included a disclaimer warning 
visitors not to disclose the site or the student’s identity to school 
officials.262 The website, created on his home computer after school 
hours, included vulgar and threatening words, sound clips, pictures 
and animation targeting his principal and algebra teacher.263 One of 
the webpages accused the principal, in vulgar terms, of having 
sexual relations with another principal.264 The webpages targeting 
the teacher profanely attacked her physique and disposition.265 The 
website also showed the teacher in a witch costume with her face 
morphing into Adolf Hitler’s.266 Additionally, the student called for 
the teacher’s termination.267 
The most disturbing webpage titled “Why Should She Die?” 
solicited twenty dollars from visitors to pay for a hitman to kill the 
teacher.268 The page identified the following as reasons for the 
teacher to die: “(1) Is it a rug, or God’s Mistake? (2) Puke Green 
Eyes (3) Zit! and (4) Hideous smile.”269 On that webpage, the 
student also repeated the following statement 136 times: “F ___ 
You Mrs. Fulmer. You Are A B ____. You Are A Stupid B 
____.”270 A final page depicted the teacher’s severed head with 
trickles of blood.271 The student informed some of his schoolmates 
of the website and even showed it to one of them while at school.272 
When the principal learned of the website, he contacted the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the police as he considered the threats 
serious.273 No charges were filed, however.274 
                                                
 262 Id. at 850–51. The disclaimer indicated that visitors clicking on the website 
were committing to these terms. Id. at 851. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. 
 268 Id. 
 269 Id. at 851 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also id. at 858. 
 270 Id. at 851. 
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 272 Id. at 852. 
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The algebra teacher lost weight, appetite, and sleep as a result 
of the website and could not complete the school year.275 She 
feared that she would indeed be killed.276 In fact, the school needed 
three substitute teachers to fill in for the algebra teacher. 277 
According to school officials, the website significantly impacted 
school morale, akin to a student or teacher’s death.278 The student 
received a three-day suspension, which was subsequently extended 
to ten days and then expulsion. 279 The student filed suit against the 
district claiming that the discipline violated his First Amendment 
right.280 Both the trial court and the appellate court ruled for the 
school district and the student appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania.281 
The court ruled that the first step in any student-speech analysis 
must be a determination of whether the virtual speech occurred on-
campus or away from campus.282 According to the court, if speech 
is on campus, the United States Supreme Court’s student-speech 
precedents will easily apply. 283  If the speech is off-campus, 
however, school officials must show a nexus between the off-
campus speech and the campus in order for the speech to fall 
within the ambit of the student-speech precedents.284 If a nexus is 
found, the speech will be converted to on-campus speech for 
                                                
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. at 852. 
 279 Id. at 852–53. 
 280 Id. at 853. 
 281 Id. 
 282 See id. at 864 (“What can be said, based upon these student expression 
cases, is that any constitutional analysis of a student’s freedom of speech must 
include a number of considerations. First, a threshold issue regarding the 
‘location’ of the speech must be resolved to determine if the unique concerns 
regarding the school environment are even implicated, i.e., is it on campus 
speech or purely off-campus speech?” (emphasis added)). 
 283 Id. at 864 (“[I]n attempting to discern the proper standard by which to 
evaluate the School District’s discipline of J.S., we must first determine whether 
the speech at issue was on-campus speech and thus, subject to United States 
Supreme Court’s student expression case law.”). 
 284 Id. at 865. 
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purposes of the First Amendment.285 A nexus will exist if the 
speech was accessed on campus, or if the speech was aimed at 
students, teachers or others connected with the school.286 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that, in the case 
before it, there was “a sufficient nexus between the web site and 
the school campus to consider the speech as occurring on-
campus.”287 The student created the nexus when he accessed the 
website at the school.288 A nexus was also established when the 
student shared the website with his schoolmates.289 Alternatively, a 
nexus was created when school officials accessed the website on 
the campus.290 A nexus was also created by the fact that the website 
was aimed at people (the teacher and the principal) connected with 
the school.291 The court declared that “where speech that is aimed 
at a specific school and/or its personnel is brought onto the school 
campus or accessed at school by its originator, the speech will be 
considered on-campus speech.”292 
Even though the court found the website in the instant case to 
be sophomoric and misguided, rather than a true threat, it ruled that 
school officials could censor the speech under both the material 
and substantial disruption test as well as the Bethel test.293 Rather 
than simply choose one of the two tests, the court decided to apply 
                                                
 285 Id. 
 286 Id.; accord. S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 
F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e expect Tinker will apply here because the 
Wilsons’ speech was, in the District Court’s words, ‘targeted at’ Lee’s Summit 
North.”); cf. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2010) 
(“Thus, the question is whether the fact that Plaintiff’s speech was arguably 
aimed at a particular audience at the school is enough by itself to label the 
speech on-campus speech. While further development of the facts may result in 
a different determination, the Court finds that it is not.”). 
 287 J.S., 807 A.2d at 865. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. Some cases have explicitly ruled that school officials cannot censor off-
campus speech is not accessed on campus. See, e.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. 
Supp. 2d 1365, 1371–72 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 293 J.S., 807 A.2d at 860, 867–68. 
DEC. 2015] Virtual Schools, Student Rights 267 
each test because the speech was both vulgar and disruptive.294 The 
court explained that the facts of the case were not on all fours with 
those of Tinker and Bethel so that made it even more prudent to 
apply both tests (as opposed to just one).295 The court, however, 
continued to express doubt about the applicability of the Bethel test 
to the case. 296  The court was more comfortable applying the 
material and substantial disruption test given that it is the choice 
test for courts reviewing virtual off-campus speech.297  This is 
surprising because the United States Supreme Court has never 
“considered whether Tinker applies to expressive conduct taking 
place off of school grounds and not during a school activity and 
has in fact noted that [t]here is some uncertainty at the outer 
                                                
 294 Id. at 867–68. 
 295 Id. at 867–68 (“The United States Supreme Court has not spoken in any 
case involving facts that are analogous to this case. Although other lower courts, 
in the context of Internet communication, have focused on Tinker, based upon 
our prior discussion, we are not convinced that reliance solely on Tinker is 
appropriate. Yet, whether the facts before us are more aligned with the events in 
Fraser and governed by the lewd and plainly offensive speech analysis, or are 
more akin to the situation in Tinker and thus subject to review for substantial 
disruption of the work of the school, we need not definitively decide, for 
application of either case results in a determination in favor of the School 
District. Thus, we will first apply Fraser, and then Tinker to the facts sub 
judice.”). 
 296 See id. at 868 (stating that “questions exist as to the applicability of Fraser 
to the instant factual scenario.”). Other courts have found the Bethel test 
inapplicable to off-campus speech. See, e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 
650 F.3d 915, 930–32 (3rd Cir. 2011); T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. 
Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 779 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 297 J.S., 807 A.2d at 865–68; accord J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 933 
(“Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever allowed schools to punish 
students for off-campus speech that is not school-sponsored or at a school-
sponsored event and that caused no substantial disruption at school. We follow 
the logic and letter of these cases . . . An opposite holding would significantly 
broaden school districts’ authority over student speech and would vest school 
officials with dangerously overbroad censorship discretion.”). 
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boundaries as to when courts should apply school speech 
precedents.”298 
Sometimes, courts chose to convert off-campus speech into on-
campus speech by virtue of the fact that the speech is aimed at 
persons at the school.299 In such a case, the United States Supreme 
Court’s student-speech precedents would be applicable to the off-
campus speech as with any on-campus speech.300 The conversion 
of off-campus speech into on-campus speech is employed when 
courts want to avoid resolving the difficult question of whether the 
Supreme Court’s student-speech precedents should be applied to 
off-campus. 
When off-campus speech is not converted to on-campus 
speech, the material and substantial disruption of the school, 
caused by off-campus speech, can create a nexus with the school, 
allowing school officials to censor the off-campus speech.301 This 
was evident in O.Z. v. Board of Trustees of Long Beach Unified 
School District302 where a student created, and posted on YouTube, 
a slideshow dramatizing her teacher’s murder. The slides depicted 
the teacher in a costume with red text describing the graphic 
scene.303 On one slide that showed a butcher knife targeting the 
teacher, the student wrote “Jelly Donut’s knife: haha fat bastard. 
here i come!”304 The knife was placed on the slain image of the 
teacher with the words “hehehe. i’m a shank yoooooooooo!”305 The 
                                                
 298 T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Frederick v. Morse, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007); Porter v. Ascension Parish 
Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n. 22 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
 299 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 300 Id. 
 301 S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 776–
77 (8th Cir. 2012); O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 2008 
WL 4396895 at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 
F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002); T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 
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 302 O.Z., 2008 WL 4396895 at *1. 
 303 Id. 
 304 Id. 
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slideshow ended with the phrase “your [sic] dead, BITCH!:D”.306 
The teacher found the slideshow on YouTube, after googling her 
name, and reported it to her principal.307 She found the video so 
disturbing that she could not sleep for days and became sick.308 The 
principal suspended the student and transferred her to another 
school.309 The student filed suit against the school district claiming 
an infringement of her First Amendment right to free speech.310 
The court ruled that the material and substantial disruption test 
governed since the case involved threatening speech that could be 
reasonably forecasted to substantially disrupt the school.311 This 
reasonable forecast, as well as the health impact on the teacher, 
provided nexus to the school.312 Accordingly, the court concluded 
that, even though the student “created the slide show off-campus, it 
created a foreseeable risk of disruption within the school,” 
justifying censorship of the speech.313 
Legal scholar Leora Harpaz keenly observed the importance of 
the nexus requirement in relation to virtual off-campus speech: 
This situation has not arisen in any of the Supreme Court cases 
reviewing public school student discipline in the face of First 
Amendment challenges. In fact, the clear inference to be drawn from 
the Court’s cases is that it is assuming the school’s authority over the 
speech of its students ends as the student leaves the schoolhouse. To 
overcome this inference, schools attempt to link the off-campus speech 
to some on-campus event; either the speech reaches the campus 
                                                
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id.  
 309 Id. at 1–2. 
 310 Id. at 2. 
 311 Id. at 2–3. 
 312 Id. at 3–4. 
 313 Id. at 4, 6. Accord Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 
2010) (“Student off-campus speech, though generally protected, could be 
subject to analysis under the Tinker standard as well if the speech raises on-
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(4th Cir. 2011). (“At bottom, we conclude that the school was authorized to 
discipline Kowalski because her speech interfered with the work and discipline 
of the school.”). 
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through some means or the off-campus speech has some effect on-
campus.314 
In sum, the above discussions show that the nexus of off-
campus speech to the school is critical in determining whether 
school officials can censor off-campus virtual speech. 
D. Virtual Speech Not Using School Resources and Time 
When determining whether school officials can censor off-
campus student speech, courts sometimes examine whether the 
student used school resources or time in creating the speech. This 
played out, for instance, in Coy ex rel. Coy v. Board of Education 
of North Canton City Schools.315 In this case, a student used his 
personal computer to create a website after school hours in his 
home.316 The student used no school resource or time in creating 
the website. 317  The website had a section called “losers” that 
included the pictures of, and insults targeting, three boys at the 
student’s school. 318  Another section of the website included 
vulgarity and a student displaying the “finger” gesture.319 
Earlier in the school year, the student had signed the school 
district’s acceptable use policy that prohibited students from 
accessing websites with offensive language on school computers.320 
A teacher expressed concern to the principal that the student might 
be violating the policy after he was observed switching between 
screens on the school computer.321 After the district technology 
specialist searched the computer’s history, he determined that the 
student had violated the policy by accessing the website on school 
computer.322 School officials then suspended the student and later 
                                                
 314 Harpaz, supra note 153, at 142-43. 
 315 Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp. 2d 
791 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 316 Id. at 795. 
 317 Id. 
 318 In the case of one boy, the insult claimed that the boy was “sexually 
aroused by his mother.” Id. 
 319 Id. 
 320 Id. 
 321 Id. at 795–96. 
 322 Id. at 796. 
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expelled him for eighty days for creating the website (as opposed 
to the on-campus access of the website).323 The student filed a First 
Amendment claim against the school district.324 
The court chose to apply the material and substantial disruption 
test to the off-campus speech.325 According to the court, the fact 
that the student only “occasionally accessed his website in a 
manner designed to draw as little attention as possible to what he 
was viewing” made the case akin to Tinker’s silent and passive 
speech.326 Although the student accessed the website on the school 
computer, the court found it critical that the student did not show 
the website to any other student.327 Most important to the court was 
the fact that the student did not use school resources or time to 
create the website which he merely surreptitiously accessed at the 
school.328 
Even though the student used vulgar language on the website, 
the court opted not to apply the Bethel test because of the 
contextual difference between the Bethel case and the case sub 
judice: “Fraser involved graphic and explicit sexual speech to a 
group of 600 students, not a student accessing a website he had 
created.” 329  The Hazelwood test was inapplicable because the 
speech was not school-sponsored speech as evident in the fact that 
the student created the speech entirely on his own time with his 
                                                
 323 Id. See id. at 797 (“Earlier, the defendants explained their discipline as 
resulting from the creation of the website, not the accessing of the website from 
school.”). We add that the school later claimed that the discipline was for 
accessing the site, though the court found evidence that the discipline was likely 
for the content. 
 324 Id. at 797. 
 325 Id. at 800. 
 326 Id. (“Tinker’s holding that it is only appropriate to regulate ‘silent, passive 
expression of opinion’ when the speech would ‘materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school’ is the proper standard for the Court to analyze the plaintiffs’ first 
claim.”). 
 327 Id. at 799. 
 328 Id. (“Most important, Coy simply accessed his own website, a website he 
created on his own time and with his own equipment.”). 
 329 Id. 
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own resources and words.330 Thus, when virtual speech is not 
created using school resources or time, the Hazelwood test would 
be inapplicable. Further, when the virtual speech involves 
accessing a student’s own personal website, created without use of 
school resources or time, it appears that Bethel would be 
inapplicable. 
E. Parodies 
Students sometimes create virtual parodies that could present 
First Amendment challenges for school officials. In order for 
speech to be deemed a parody for purposes of the First 
Amendment, it must be shown that no one would reasonably 
believe that the speech is describing actual facts.331 There must also 
be clear exaggeration in the speech to effect humor.332 Speech that 
satisfies these requirements is protected under the First 
Amendment.333 
As in Barnett ex rel. Barnett v. Tipton County Board of 
Education, students at times claim that their speech constitutes a 
parody in order to avoid school discipline.334 In Barnett ex rel. 
Barnett, students created fake MySpace profiles of the high school 
coach and the assistant principal.335 The profile of the assistant 
principal included his biography and photograph copied from the 
district website.336 It also included sexual comments directed at 
female students, leading a parent and reporter who discovered the 
site to think that the assistant principal had been inappropriate with 
students.337 The parent and the reporter notified school officials.338 
                                                
 330 Id. at 800. 
 331 Barnett ex rel. Barnett v. Tipton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 601 F. Supp. 2d 980, 
984 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 
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The three students involved were given in-school suspensions.339 
One of them also received a two-day suspension from school and 
was sent to an alternative school for the rest of the school year.340 
The students filed suit claiming that school officials violated their 
First Amendment rights by disciplining them for their virtual 
parodies.341 The court dismissed their claim because the profiles 
were not clearly exaggerated.342 Further, visitors to the site, such as 
the reporter as well as the parent, reasonably believed the profile 
described actual facts.343 Besides, the MySpace profile used the 
actual profile and biography from the district website, further 
suggesting an authenticity to the profile.344 Additionally, there was 
no humor to the profile.345 Consequently, students seeking parody 
protection for virtual speech under the First Amendment need to 
present strong evidence clearly showing that the speech is 
indisputably humorous and fictitious.346  
VII. ASSURING A COMMODIOUS VIRTUAL CAMPUS 
Given that virtual students can complete their work at any time 
of the day and on any day, it is difficult to delineate when students 
are off-campus versus on-campus. This is amplified by the 
integration of competency-based education (“CBE”) into virtual 
education. CBE is an educational “approach [that] allows students 
to advance based on their ability to master a skill or competency at 
their own pace regardless of environment.”347 Virtual students may 
be offline and yet be working on school assignments at home. Such 
is the case with Connections Academy where elementary students 
work on the computer for approximately ten percent of schooling 
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 347 Educause Library: Competency-Based Education (CBE), EDUCAUSE, at 
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time, middle school students for about thirty percent and high 
schoolers for fifty percent.348 
It is unclear whether schoolwork completed during the 
traditional school hours of the weekday should constitute on-
campus work just as it would in a brick and mortar school or 
whether the work should be treated as homework that brick and 
mortar school students complete at home after their school hours; 
with the difference being that, for virtual students, those 
“afterschool” hours could occur at any time of the day, once the 
student is not actively engaged in instruction and learning on the 
school’s learning management system or other platform. While the 
United States Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he principal use to 
which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during 
prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities,”349 
virtual schools do not necessarily have prescribed hours except for 
synchronous sessions. Therein lies the challenge in deciphering the 
scope of a school’s censorship authority under the First 
Amendment. This is even more evident under the independent 
instructional model where students have very little contact with 
teachers and complete the lion’s share of their work in offline 
settings.350 
Historical practice dictates that students in brick and mortar 
schools working offline, at home after school on homework, are 
generally beyond the purview of the school since they are working 
exclusively within the privacy of their homes. Unlike those 
students, however, virtual schools generally reside inside the 
virtual student’s home. All the student needs to do to engage is to 
log on to the learning management system to connect with 
curriculum content and, if synchronous, with an instructor. 351 
Certainly, when the student is engaged with the learning 
management system, the student is on the virtual campus. 
                                                
 348 Vanourek & Evergreen Education Group, supra note 3, at 7–8. 
 349 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 512 
(1969). 
 350 See supra Part III for a description of this model. See generally Ahn, supra 
note 19; Huerta et al., supra note 12 (discussing instructional models). 
 351 See supra Part III for a description of synchronous delivery. 
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Similarly, when the student is on any other online platform or 
webinar for the virtual school, or using its video or audio system, 
the student is on the virtual campus. To avoid any confusion about 
the boundaries of the school, the school’s acceptable use policy 
(“AUP”) should explicitly define the scope of the virtual campus. 
Further, in order to enlarge the school’s censorship orbit in such a 
way that a reviewing court might at least find an implicit virtual 
campus, the AUP should also distinctly state that communications 
on the learning management system are subject to monitoring and 
censorship. Parents and students should be required to affirm 
acknowledgement and consent to the policy with their signatures. 
Virtual schools have an interest in the judiciary finding a broad 
virtual campus and expansive classrooms, especially if courts are 
reluctant to recognize broad school authority over off-campus 
speech. After all, the Supreme Court has ruled that school officials 
have censorship authority on campus; and in the classroom, school 
officials have leeway to determine the manner of speech that is 
appropriate.352 
During the hours of virtual campus instructional and learning 
sessions, students might engage in electronic utterances on sites or 
platforms besides the school’s platforms or sites. The question 
arises whether such electronic utterances outside of the school’s 
platform constitute off-campus or on-campus speech. If the school 
provides the computer and/or Internet access for the student’s 
virtual schooling, then, arguably, the entirety of the student’s 
communication on the computer or Internet access is on-campus 
speech. This would encompass the electronic utterances outside of 
the school’s platform occurring on the school-provided computer 
and/or Internet access. To ensure that a court supports this 
reasoning, the AUP needs to be very clear. The policy should 
explicitly state that all communications on the computer and 
Internet access (even those on non-school platforms) are subject to 
the school’s purview and censorship with no right to privacy for 
students on the school-provided technology. 
                                                
 352 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
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Even when the school provides the computer, but not the 
Internet access, the AUP should clearly state that, irrespective of 
the source of the Internet access, all content on the school 
computer is subject to inspection and censorship with no student 
expectation of privacy. Where the AUP does not have such 
language, or the student is using his home computer, the scope of 
students’ First Amendment rights becomes less clear. Specifically, 
when a virtual student makes electronic utterances on his personal 
computer during synchronous school hours, are those electronic 
utterances on-campus or off-campus speech? 
As mentioned previously in the discussion of Requa v. Kent 
School District No. 415353 in order to resolve this, the court would 
try to isolate any on-campus component of the speech from its off-
campus component. If the AUP is clear about the scope of the 
virtual campus, and the computer or the Internet access is provided 
by the school, the court will likely view the entire speech as on-
campus speech. Furthermore, if the student used any element of the 
school’s server, learning management system, platform, or video 
or audio system for the electronic utterance, then that portion of the 
utterance would be deemed to be on-campus speech and thus be 
subject to censorship under one of the Supreme Court’s student-
speech precedents. If the student used his home computer when the 
electronic utterance occurred, it might be more challenging to 
isolate the on-campus component from the off-campus component. 
As illustrated above, if the on-campus component cannot be 
separated from the off-campus component of the utterance, courts 
will look for a connection between the school and the speech to 
determine if it is censorable.354 Such connection would include 
whether any component of the off-campus speech was brought to 
                                                
 353 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277–80 (W.D. Wash. 2007); see also supra Part 
VI.A (discussing the judicial distinction of off-campus and on-campus speech). 
 354 D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766–67 (8th Cir. 
2011). See supra Part VI.C “Location As Context And The Nexus Requirement 
for Off-Campus Virtual Speech” (discussing the judicial search for connection 
between off-campus speech and the school’s campus). See also supra Part VI.B 
“Off-Campus Virtual Speech Brought On Campus” (discussing the significance 
of off-campus speech brought on campus). 
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the virtual campus or was reasonably foreseeable to get to the 
attention of school officials.355 If so, most courts apply the material 
and substantial disruption test, irrespective of whether the speech 
originated off-campus or on-campus.356 
If the speech is reasonably foreseeable to cause a material and 
substantial disruption within the virtual school, a nexus is created 
between the speech and the virtual campus which brings the speech 
within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s student-speech 
precedents.357 A nexus is also created when the student shares the 
speech with his virtual schoolmates or when school officials access 
the speech on campus.358 Moreover, a nexus would be found if the 
speech was directed at persons connected to the virtual school.359 
Indeed, in such a case, the court might simply convert the off-
campus speech into on-campus speech, making censorship under 
the Supreme Court’s student-speech precedents more accessible 
and accordant.360 
These nexus rules similarly apply when the virtual student 
communicates outside school hours without using any school 
resources.361 In that situation, of the four student-speech tests, only 
the material and substantial disruption test would be applicable.362 
                                                
 355 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 
34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) 
 356 J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 
1103 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 357 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 358 J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002). 
 359 Id. (“[W]here speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its personnel 
is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the 
speech will be considered on-campus speech.”). 
 360 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 361 See Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp. 
2d 791, 795–97 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. 
Supp. 2d 1175, 1177–80 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
 362 Coy ex rel. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 795-79. See also supra Part VI.D 
“Virtual Speech Not Using School Resources and Time.” As noted in that 
section, the Hazelwood test would be inapplicable because without school 
resources or time, the speech would not constitute school-sponsored speech. The 
Bethel test would be inapplicable because of a lack of contextual fit. See also 	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Another consideration in determining the constitutionality of 
school censorship of student speech is the forum of the speech. 
VIII. PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS 
The First Amendment accords different levels of protection to 
speech based on the forum in which the speech occurs.363 In order 
to determine the level of protection due, courts balance the 
government entity’s “interest in limiting the use of its property to 
its intended purpose [against] the interest of those wishing to use 
the property for other purposes.”364 Nevertheless, “[i]n cases where 
the principal function of the property would be disrupted by 
expressive activity, the Court is particularly reluctant to hold that 
the government intended to designate a public forum.”365 Based on 
this balancing test, the Supreme Court has divided forums into four 
categories: traditional public forums; designated public forums; 
limited public forums; and non-public forums (closed forums).366 
Speech in public parks, streets and sidewalks has the highest 
level of protection because those are “places which by long 
tradition or by government fiat [that] have been devoted to 
assembly and debate.”367 According to the United States Supreme 
                                                                                                         
Coy ex rel. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (“Fraser involved graphic and explicit 
sexual speech to a group of 600 students, not a student accessing a website . . .” ). 
 363 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
 364 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 
(1985). 
 365 Id. at 804. 
 366 See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 37; Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of 
the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11 
(2011) (discussing the various public forum categories). 
 367 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 
(1939) (“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, 
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public 
places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, 
and liberties of citizens.”); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (“No 
particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all 
public streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional 
public fora.”). 
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Court, public parks, streets and sidewalks are “quintessential 
public forums.” 368 In such places, known as traditional public 
forums, the government’s authority to censor speech is “sharply 
circumscribed.” 369  In traditional public forums, content-based 
censorship is prohibited unless the government shows that it has a 
compelling reason for the censorship; and that the censorship is 
narrowly tailored to the compelling reason. 370  Content-neutral 
censorship371—related to time, place, and manner regulations372—is 
permissible in traditional public forums if the government can 
establish the following: (1) there is a significant government 
                                                
 368 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 369 Id.; see also id. at 55 (“In a [traditional] public forum, by definition, all 
parties have a constitutional right of access and the State must demonstrate 
compelling reasons for restricting access to a single class of speakers, a single 
viewpoint, or a single subject.”). 
 370 Id. at 45; see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). This is the 
strict scrutiny standard of review. According to the Supreme Court, “[a] statute 
is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of 
the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485 (citing City Council of 
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808–10 (1984)). See also 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (citing United States v. 
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (“the requirement of narrow tailoring is 
satisfied “so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government 
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. To be sure, 
this standard does not mean that . . . regulation may burden substantially more 
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. 
Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial 
portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.”). 
 371 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (citing Virginia Pharmacy 
Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)) 
(“‘[C]ontent-neutral’ speech restrictions [are] those that ‘are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech’”). 
 372 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) (quoting Cox v. New 
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941)) (“It is, of course, undisputed that 
appropriate, limited discretion, under properly drawn statutes or ordinances, 
concerning the time, place, duration, or manner of use of the streets for public 
assemblies may be vested in administrative officials, provided that such limited 
discretion is exercised with uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of 
each application, free from improper or inappropriate considerations and from 
unfair discrimination [and with] a systematic, consistent and just order of 
treatment . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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reason for the censorship; (2) the censorship is narrowly tailored to 
the significant government reason; and (3) even with the 
censorship, the government has left the speaker with sufficient 
alternate avenues for the speech.373 Virtual schools are certainly not 
traditional public forums since they have not been held in public 
trust immemorially as forums for indiscriminate public use for 
speech or assembly.374 
Virtual schools could fall under one of three forum categories: 
designated public forums, limited public forums, or non-public 
forums (closed forums). 375  Non-public forums are government 
properties that are neither immemorially, or by government 
designation, forums for public debate and assembly.376 In non-
public forums, the government can reserve the forum for its 
intended purpose, exclude speech or assembly, and discriminate 
based on subject matter or speaker identity if the censorship is: (1) 
reasonable, and (2) not designed to censor speech simply because 
of the viewpoint expressed.377 The government can also censor 
                                                
 373 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See Ward, 491 U.S. at 802 
(describing the alternate-avenue requirement by stating that the government 
censorship “continues to permit expressive activity . . . and has no effect on the 
quantity or content of that expression beyond regulating the extent of 
amplification that the city’s limitations on volume may reduce to some degree 
the potential audience for respondent’s speech is of no consequence for there has 
been no showing that the remaining avenues of communication are 
inadequate.”). 
 374 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267. (1988). 
 375 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–77 (1981). Virtual schools cannot 
be traditional public forums because they have not been held by long tradition in 
trust for the public for debate and assembly. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
In fact, the Supreme Court has been very resistant to expanding traditional 
public forums beyond public parks, streets and sidewalks, declaring that “[t]he 
Court has rejected the view that traditional publicforumstatus extends beyond its 
historic confines.” Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 
(1998). 
 376 See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 377 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) 
(internal citations omitted) (“Although a speaker may be excluded from a 
nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the 	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speech in non-public forums using reasonable time, place and 
manner regulations. 378  According to the Supreme Court, the 
government has increased censorship powers in non-public forums 
because the government is entitled to reserve some of its properties 
for specific purposes, which is similar to the right of private 
property owners to reserve their properties for certain purposes.379 
Otherwise, the functions of government will be compromised.380 
A virtual public school is a non-public forum unless the school 
has intentionally opened up the property, through practice or 
policy, to the general public or to a part of the public for 
indiscriminate use.381 “Publicly owned or operated property does 
not become a public forum simply because members of the public 
are permitted to come and go at will.”382 Accordingly, the mere fact 
that students are allowed to use a virtual school’s learning 
management system, video or audio system, discussion forums, 
RSS feeds,383 blogs, podcasts, and wikis at convenient times when 
                                                                                                         
purpose of the forum, or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose 
especial benefit the forum was created, the government violates the First 
Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of 
view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.”); see also Perry Educ. 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46–49 (“Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the 
right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker 
identity. These distinctions may be impermissible in a public forum but are 
inherent and inescapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to 
activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property. The touchstone 
for evaluating these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in light of the 
purpose which the forum at issue serves.”). 
 378 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 379 Id.; United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns., 453 
U.S. 114, 129–30 (1981). 
 380 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966). See generally Greer v. Spock, 
424 U.S. 828 (1976). 
 381 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–69 
(1981). See also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (“The government does not create a 
public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by 
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”). 
 382 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 383 RSS is also referred to as Really Simple Syndication. See WHAT IS RSS? 
RSS EXPLAINED, http://www.whatisrss.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2015) (“RSS 	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they can log in at will does not convert these forums into public 
forums. If the school or any of its platforms is a non-public forum, 
the school can censor speech within the specific forum in question 
as long as the censorship is viewpoint neutral and reasonable.384 
The school’s “decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need 
only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only 
reasonable limitation.”385 
When a virtual school is opened up for specific topics or 
specific groups, it becomes a limited public forum.386 As a limited 
public forum, a virtual public school is “not required to and does 
not allow persons to engage in every type of speech.”387 The 
school, however, does not wield unbridled censorship power as a 
limited public forum: the First Amendment prohibits the school 
from viewpoint discrimination and from imposing censorship that 
is unreasonable when the purpose of the forum is considered.388 
When a virtual public school is opened up for indiscriminate 
public use, it becomes a designated public forum.389 As long as the 
                                                                                                         
(Rich Site Summary) is a format for delivering regularly changing web content. 
Many news-related sites, weblogs and other online publishers syndicate their 
content as an RSS Feed to whoever wants it.”). 
 384 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (1985). 
 385 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 386 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
392–93 (1993); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
46 n.7 (1983). 
 387 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001); see Perry 
Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46. 
 388 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 
106–07. 
 389 See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. 
at 45–46. In order for a court to find school property to be a designated public 
forum or a limited public forum, the intent of the school to open up the property 
must be clear as evidenced from policy or practice. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802–
03. See also Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) 
(“A designated public forum is not created when the government allows 
selective access for individual speakers rather than general access for a class of 
speakers.”). 
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property is open to the public for indiscriminate use for speech or 
assembly, a virtual school that is a designated public forum is 
governed by the same First Amendment standards as a traditional 
public forum.390 In other words, content-based censorship must be 
justified by a compelling reason and the censorship must be 
narrowly tailored to serve that reason.391 Further, as long as the 
regulations leave open sufficient alternate speech forums, the 
school may impose content-neutral speech regulations that are 
narrowly tailored to satisfy a significant interest for the 
censorship.392 
A school that is a designated public forum or limited public 
forum need not indefinitely remain a designated or limited public 
forum; it can revert back to being a non-public forum if the school 
closes the forum and returns it to its intended purposes.393 Further, 
discrimination within limited public forums, or in designated 
public forums against content or subject matter that fits the criteria 
for which the forum was intentionally opened is subject to the 
strict scrutiny standard of review.394 Thus, the school must have a 
compelling interest and narrowly tailor its restriction on speech to 
achieve the compelling interest.395 
Even if a virtual school is a limited public forum or a 
designated public forum, it does not mean that all forums within 
the school are limited public forums or designated public forums 
respectively.396 Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled that the First 
Amendment does not obligate schools to provide equivalent access 
to all parts of the school for communicative purposes. 397 
                                                
 390 See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46. 
 391 Id. 
 392 Id. at 45–46; see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1981). 
 393 See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 394 This is the essence of content-based discrimination. 
 395 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n, 523 U.S. at 677; Perry Educ. 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 49. 
 396 See generally Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37. 
 397 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 44; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 117–18 (1972) (“But we nowhere suggested that students, 
teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a 	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Nevertheless, similar to a virtual school itself, computers and 
Internet access at virtual schools could be designated public 
forums, limited public forums or non-public forums, depending on 
whether the school allows indiscriminate use of the school-
provided computers and Internet access, or only permits use 
limited to specific topics or groups.398 
Students post comments on school discussion forums, blogs 
and wikis that could be part of the school’s learning management 
system.399 Those comments could disagree with or criticize other 
students, the school, teachers, or administrators, or express views 
that school officials find unacceptable. 400  Even though those 
forums could be designated public forums (if the school opens 
them up to indiscriminate use) or limited public forums (if the 
school opens them up for use on specific topics or to its group of 
students), they are generally non-public forums reserved for 
                                                                                                         
school building or its immediate environs for his unlimited expressive 
purposes.”). 
 398 We add the caveat that while the Supreme Court has not denied use of the 
public forum doctrine in online contexts, it has expressed hesitancy about carte 
blanche application of the doctrine to the Internet. See United States v. Am. 
Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 207 n.3 (2003) (citing Denver Area Ed.. 
Telcoms. Consortium v. Fed FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996)) (“Even if 
appellees had proffered more persuasive evidence that public libraries intended 
to create a forum for speech by connecting to the Internet, we would hesitate to 
import the public forum doctrine . . . wholesale into the context of the Internet 
. . . . [W]e are wary of the notion that a partial analogy in one context, for which 
we have developed doctrines, can compel a full range of decisions in such a new 
and changing area.”). Nonetheless, the Court has ruled that the public forum 
doctrine applies to all government property, including metaphysical spaces. See 
Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 230 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector 
& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (“[A] forum more in a 
metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are 
applicable.”); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 44. For 
examples of the Court applying the public forum doctrine to discussion of 
metaphysical forums, including the Internet, see generally Christian Legal Soc’y 
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2011); United States v. 
Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997). 
 399 Jaffee, supra note 4, at 228. 
 400 Id. 
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educational purposes. As non-public forums, the school can censor 
speech on the discussion forums, blogs, and wikis if the censorship 
is reasonable and not viewpoint discriminatory.401 
Michigan Virtual School is a good example of a school that has 
tried to establish a non-public forum theme in its AUP. The policy 
provides in pertinent part: 
MVS [Michigan Virtual School] instructional computing resources are 
intended solely for course related activities specific to the intent of the 
course the student is enrolled in. 
A. Users shall not upload or post any software on MVS instructional 
computing resources, including web development servers, which is not 
specifically required and approved for course assignments. Non-
approved materials will be removed by the MVU [Michigan Virtual 
University] staff without notice. 
B. Users shall not post any MP3 files, compressed video or images 
unless they are a part of the instructional activities in an MVS course, 
nor load any other non-instructional media files to any MVS server.402 
Virginia Virtual School’s policy, on the other hand, provides 
that: 
Communications via Virtual Virginia software and resources should 
not be considered private. (This includes, but is not limited to, the e-
mail, pager, discussion board, blog, and chat tools in the course 
management system and other Virtual Virginia resources.) Students . . . 
who have the privilege to use virtual school online resources are 
expected to . . . [u]se the online resources only for school-related, 
educational activities.403 
                                                
 401 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 402  Michigan Virtual School, supra note 40 (“MVS or MVU are used 
interchangeably in this agreement.”). 
 403 Virginia Virtual School, Student and Parent Handbook: Virtual Virginia, 
VA. DEPT. OF EDUC. 16 (2014), http://www.virtualvirginia.org/students/ 
handbook/downloads/student_handbook.pdf (last visited June 21, 2015). 
Philadelphia School District’s AUP clearly shows its system is intended to be a 
non-public forum: “The district has the right to place restrictions on the use of 
equipment, resources and material users access or disclose through the district’s 
Internet, computers and network resources. Users are expected to follow School 
Reform Commission policies and administrative procedures governing conduct 
and discipline, and law and regulations, in their use of the district’s Internet, 
computers and network resources. . . . This access has not been established as a 
public access service or a public forum. . . .” The School District of 	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As with both Michigan and Virginia Virtual Schools, any 
virtual school looking to control student speech should characterize 
its learning platforms as non-public forums.404 For evidentiary 
purposes, on each platform, the school could explicitly disavow 
any intent to create a limited public forum or designated public 
forum. The school must also ensure its practices do not provide 
any basis for a court to find circumstantial or direct evidence that 
the platform was opened up intentionally to create a limited public 
forum or designated public forum. 
IX. GOVERNMENT SPEECH ANALYSIS 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right of 
government entities to speak on various issues, free from 
competing voices and the restraints of the Free Speech Clause, 
                                                                                                         
Philadelphia, supra note 40. See also id. (“Users shall have no expectation of 
privacy in anything they create, store, send, delete, receive or display on or over 
the district’s Internet, computers or network resources, including personal files 
or any use of the district’s Internet, computers or network resources. The district 
reserves the right to monitor, track, and log network access and use . . . .”). 
 404 Louisiana Virtual School’s AUP, for instance, clearly states that “Students 
will work within the confines of the infrastructure of Blackboard.com for 
messaging, bulletin/discussion board use, and virtual chat (unless directed 
elsewhere by the instructor).” Louisiana Virtual School, supra note 40, at 2. The 
policy further provides that “Posting personal messages outside of classroom 
content shall be forbidden.” Id. See also Florida Virtual School, supra note 41, 
at 32 (restricting emails to course-related content). Virginia Virtual School seeks 
to maintain the reins on its forums by including the following in its policy: “As 
cited in Virtual Virginia’s Acceptable Use Policy, students should not consider 
communication within Virtual Virginia’s course management system as private. 
Communication through the pager, e-mail, discussion board, chat, blog, and 
other communication tools provided by Virtual Virginia is subject to monitoring 
by Virtual Virginia staff without other prior notice. Inappropriate use of any 
Virtual Virginia communication tool, such as using these tools for profanity or 
cyberbullying, is grounds for discipline including but not necessarily limited to 
the following: parental contact; local school contact; application of local student 
code of conduct consequences; administrative removal from Virtual Virginia 
courses; or contact of law enforcement agencies in instances where violation of 
local, state, or federal laws is suspected.” Virginia Virtual School, supra note 
403. 
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pursuant to the government-speech doctrine. 405  This “recently 
minted” doctrine406 has particular application to virtual schools 
because it empowers schools to censor speech without First 
Amendment consequence. 407  Government speech can best be 
described as follows: 
Government speech is a broad category that includes any government 
action that communicates or subsidizes the communication of a 
particular message. It encompasses activities from appropriating 
taxpayer money to campaign for or against specific legislative 
measures to deciding who gets access to public fora such as theatres 
and broadcasting frequencies to offering a program of subsidies for 
expression—for example, funding for the arts—that makes content-
based decisions among qualified applicants. The government can be 
said to ‘speak’ when it pays for speech directly, when it provides access 
to public property for the communication of a given message, or when 
an elected official voices her opinion on a given issue.408 
The Supreme Court articulated the government-speech doctrine 
in Rust v. Sullivan.409 In Rust, petitioners claimed that federal 
regulations prohibiting Title X fund recipients from conducting 
abortion-related activities violated the First Amendment because 
the regulations barred those recipients from discussing abortion as 
an option for family planning while requiring them to offer 
information about carrying a pregnancy to term.410 The Supreme 
Court rejected the petitioners’ argument, reasoning that the 
                                                
 405 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 406  Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
 407 The Supreme Court has recognized applicability of the government-speech 
doctrine in not only physical spaces but also metaphysical spaces. Rosenberger 
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). Accordingly, the 
doctrine is applicable to online platforms. 
 408 Charlotte H. Taylor, Hate Speech and Government Speech, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1115, 1142–43 (2010). 
 409 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). See also Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 
541 (“The Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the 
counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental 
speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, we have 
explained Rust on this understanding.”). 
 410 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 177–78, 192. 
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government has the right to espouse and even promote certain 
values.411 The Court explained that: 
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively 
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the 
public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program 
which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the 
Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has 
merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other. A 
legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental 
right does not infringe the right.412 
Thus, if the government chooses to support democratic values, 
it is not required to support competing ideologies like communism 
and fascism.413 In the same vein, if virtual schools, on their learning 
management systems, webinars, video or audio conferences, or 
other platforms choose to espouse values more suitable to 
education, they can opt to disallow competing values on those 
platforms. Indeed, in Rosenberger v. Rector, the Supreme Court 
empowered government entities to make content-based decisions 
when government speech is involved.414 Specifically, in addressing 
whether the University of Virginia had made unconstitutional 
content-based choices, the Court stated: 
                                                
 411  See id. at 192–93 (“[T]he government may make a value judgment 
favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the 
allocation of public funds.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maher 
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). 
 412 Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 413 Id. at 194; see also ACLU v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 379 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“Government can certainly speak out on public issues supported by a broad 
consensus, even though individuals have a First Amendment right not to express 
agreement. For instance, government can distribute pins that say ‘Register and 
Vote,’ issue postage stamps during World War II that say ‘Win the War,’ and 
sell license plates that say ‘Spay or Neuter your Pets.’ Citizens clearly have the 
First Amendment right to oppose such widely-accepted views, but that right 
cannot conceivably require the government to distribute ‘Don’t Vote’ pins, to 
issue postage stamps in 1942 that say ‘Stop the War,’ or to sell license plates 
that say ‘Spaying or Neutering your Pet is Cruel.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 414 See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819 (1995) (discussing government entities’ authority to engage in content-
based censorship if the speech is government speech). 
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[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices. 
When the University determines the content of the education it 
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the 
government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when 
it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its own 
message.415 
This same rule would apply to virtual schools, authorizing 
them to make content-based decisions on their platforms pursuant 
to the government-speech doctrine. 
The United States Supreme Court further defined/elucidated 
nuances of government-speech in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing 
Ass’n.416 The Court ruled speech must be “effectively controlled” 
by the government entity for it to be deemed government speech.417 
Virtual schools would be wise to be intentional in documenting 
their efforts showing that they satisfy the following five factors 
that prove that speech is “effectively controlled” by them:418 (1) the 
school created the speech “from beginning to end”; (2) the school 
“set out the overarching message” of the speech; (3) any non-
government entity (including students) authorized by the school to 
contribute some details to the speech remained accountable to the 
school for the speech; (4) the school had “final approval authority 
over every word used”; and (5) the school reviewed the speech’s 
wording and substance.419 If the school “sets the overall message to 
                                                
 415 Id. at 833. 
 416 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
 417 Id. at 560. 
 418 See id. at 560–61 (discussing these five factors identified by the Supreme 
Court as essential to proving that a government entity is in control of speech). 
These are referred to as the Johanns factors. 
 419 Id. A sixth pertinent factor considers whether the government entity 
attended and participated in open meetings for the development of the proposal 
or program that contained the speech. Prior to Johanns, several federal courts of 
appeals applied a non-exclusive four-factor list to determine if speech was 
private or government speech: the central purpose of the program in which the 
speech occurs, the degree of editorial control exercised by government or private 
entities over speech content, the identity of the literal speaker, and whether the 
government or private entity bears the ultimate responsibility for the content of 
the speech. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. 
Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618–19 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing the 	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be communicated and approves every word that is disseminated, it 
is not precluded from relying on the government speech doctrine 
merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental 
sources [including students] in developing specific messages.”420 
More recently, in Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum,421 the 
Court ruled that private speech, not government speech, is subject 
to the Free Speech Clause. 422  Therefore, when speech is 
government speech, the government entity has wide latitude to 
decide what it says and to “say what it wishes.”423 In this light, a 
virtual school has the power to “select the views that it wants to 
express” from competing views.424 The Court explained that, in 
order to function effectively, the “government has to say 
something, and a First Amendment heckler’s veto of any forced 
contribution to raising the government’s voice in the ‘marketplace 
of ideas’ would be out of the question.”425 
In consonance with the Supreme Court, “in freedom of speech 
cases, lower courts have accepted the Rust-inspired government 
speech doctrine and seem to be aware that when the government 
has a message to send, such a message need not be viewpoint-
neutral, and other messages need not receive governmental 
support.”426 This was evident in Downs v. Los Angeles Unified 
                                                                                                         
four factors); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 203 
F.3d 1085, 1093–94 (8th Cir. 2000). It is unclear if these factors will and should 
continue to play as key a role as they did prior to Johanns. 
 420 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562. 
 421 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 422 See id. at 467. 
 423 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 
833). 
 424 Summum, 555 U.S. at 467 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194; Nat’l Endowment 
for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)). See also 
Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 (“[I]t is the very business of government to favor and 
disfavor points of view.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 425 Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 574 (Souter, J., 
dissenting)). 
 426 Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 
379 (2009). 
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School Dist.427 In Downs, a public school teacher posted counter-
speech in response to his/her district’s speech on school bulletin 
boards, celebrating Gay and Lesbian Awareness month.428 The 
court of appeals ruled that the bulletin boards represented “an 
example of the government opening up its own mouth”; therefore, 
constituting government speech.429 Hence, the district did not have 
to share its podium with counter-speech.430 Furthermore, the court 
ruled “[s]imply because the government opens its mouth to speak 
does not give every outside individual or group a First Amendment 
right to play ventriloquist.” 431  The court highlighted a key 
distinction between public forum (which involves government 
regulation of private speech) and government speech (which is 
government regulation of government speech): 
[W]hen a public high school is the speaker, its control of its own 
speech is not subject to the constraints of constitutional safeguards and 
forum analysis, but instead is measured by practical considerations 
applicable to any individual’s choice of how to convey oneself: among 
other things, content, timing, and purpose.432 
Discussion forums, blogs, wikis, and other message forums for 
virtual schools are similar to the bulletin board in the Downs case. 
Although the school solicits the views of students in promoting its 
broader educational message, in those forums, the school should be 
able to edit or entirely censor student speech that is counter to the 
school’s message. In order for speech in forums made available to 
students to constitute government speech, however, the school 
must show that the speech satisfies the five factors above from the 
Johanns case.433 
As the Supreme Court has emphasized, when the government 
platform conveys a message over which the government has 
editorial control and final authority, even if private citizens 
                                                
 427 Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 428 Id. at 1005–08. 
 429 Id. at 1012–13. 
 430 Id. 
 431 Id. at 1013. 
 432 Id. at 1011–13. 
 433 Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562. 
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participate in the speech, the message is still government speech.434 
Moreover, in the case of government speech, virtual schools have 
the right to exclude “unwelcomed speech in the time, place, and 
space of government speech activity.”435  Given the significant 
control that the government-speech doctrine affords over student 
speech, shrewd virtual schools would set up their various platforms 
in such a way that speech within those platforms qualify as 
government speech. Virtual schools should include clear language 
on their platforms stating that all communication thereon 
constitutes government speech. For evidentiary purposes, the 
school could explicitly document that, in practice and intent, it 
meets the requirements of the five Johanns factors; and that it has 
clearly and indubitably communicated to students that the school 
retains absolute editorial control over all content on the school’s 
platforms. For schools seeking more authority over student 
communication, it would be foolish not to document compliance 
with the Johanns factors in a calculated effort to capitalize on the 
government-speech doctrine. After all, the government-speech 
doctrine makes possible “what had previously been thought 
forbidden: the burdening, even if not silencing, of private 
viewpoints because the government disagrees with them.”436 
X. CONTENT-BASED DISCRIMINATION AND ACCEPTABLE 
USE POLICIES: NETIQUETTE RESTRICTIONS AND OFFENSIVE 
STATEMENTS 
Acceptable Use Policies (“AUPs”) regulate student access to 
digital content in order to protect students from online vices and to 
                                                
 434  Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 203 F.3d at 1094. For more on the 
government-speech doctrine, see Joseph O. Oluwole, Revisiting Parents 
Involved v. Seattle School District: Race Consciousness and the Government-
Speech Doctrine, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 393 (2013); Joseph Blocher, 
Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695 (2011); 
Randall P. Bezanson, The Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 
809 (2010); Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975 (2011). 
 435 Bezanson, supra note 434, at 809. 
 436 Blocher, supra note 434, at 695. 
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preserve the learning environment.437 The following explication of 
the design behind AUPs (netiquette codes) 438 fastidiously reveals 
troubling concerns about student access to technology, especially 
in an educational environment: 
A critical concern is: How can we best assure that students will not 
have access to pornography, hate sites, or other pernicious Internet 
content or experience sexual or physical harassment. There is also 
concern about students wasting instructional time in social media sites, 
engaging in cyberbullying, harassing of other students, or cheating on 
tests.439 
In addition, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
has identified five elements that must be addressed in AUPs: 
(a) Access by minors to inappropriate matter on the Internet; 
(b) The safety and security of minors when using electronic mail, chat 
rooms and other forms of direct electronic communications; 
(c) Unauthorized access, including so-called “hacking,” and other 
unlawful activities by minors online; 
(d) Unauthorized disclosure, use, and dissemination of personal 
information regarding minors; and 
(e) Measures restricting minors’ access to materials harmful to them.440 
The above concerns, as well as the FCC mandates, have fueled 
schools’ design and use of AUPs to engage in content-based 
discrimination in an effort to ensure student safety and academic 
success.441 
AUPs span a broad range in their approach to censoring student 
speech: 
In public schools, this approach often presents itself in policies that 
prohibit broad categories of behavior or access: banning cell phones, 
blocking social networking sites, filtering certain topics or words. 
Taken to an extreme, these policies can lead to results ranging from 
                                                
 437 See section IV titled “Enforcement of Student Behavior.” 
 438 Netiquette refers to network etiquette. It is also a reference to the rules of 
appropriate speech dictated in AUPs. Michigan Virtual School, supra note 40. 
 439 Bosco, supra note 39. 
 440 Id. at 3 (citing Children’s Internet Protection Act, § 1701, 114 Stat. 2763A-
335, available at https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/cipa.pdf (last 
visited June 16, 2015). 
 441 Bosco, supra note 39 at 3. 
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humorous (one student was unable to do a report on his Congressman, 
Dick Armey, due to a keyword filter) to truly restrictive (a new policy 
in one Massachusetts district limits teachers and students to using only 
online services that have been approved by, and signed contracts with, 
the district).442 
AUPs that single out a specific kind of speech (e.g. race, 
gender, or sexual orientation discrimination) for protection might 
run into content-based discrimination challenges. 443  AUPs also 
sometimes prohibit racial slurs and racially-discriminatory 
comments. 444  Michigan Virtual School’s AUP, for instance, 
prohibits “bigotry, racism, [and] hatred.” 445  Virginia Virtual 
School’s AUP, on the other hand, states in pertinent part: “Do not 
use expressions of bigotry, racism, and/or hate.”446 Agora Cyber 
Charter School’s AUP provides that students should not “use 
derogatory comments, including those regarding race, age, gender, 
sexual orientation, religion, ability, political persuasion, body type, 
physical or mental health, or access issues.”447 Such provisions are 
designed to censor hate speech – speech targeting the victim 
                                                
 442 Shelley B. Chamberlain et al., MASS. EDUC. TECH. ADVISORY COUNCIL, 
RESPONSIBLE TECHNOLOGY USE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1–2 (2009), available at 
http://www.doe.mass.edu/boe/sac/edtech/safety.pdf (last visited June 21, 2015). 
 443 See Geng, supra note 1, at 162 (“[I]f a regulation distinguishes on its face 
between ‘favored speech [and] disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or 
views’ being expressed, then it is content-based.” (citing Turner Broad. Sys., 
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994)). 
 444  Austin Independent School District, AUSTIN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT ACCEPTABLE USE GUIDELINES 1 (2013), https://www.austinisd.org/ 
sites/default/files/dept/technology/docs/AU_Guidelines_20131206.pdf (last 
visited June 21, 2015) (prohibiting “inappropriate language such as swear 
words, vulgarity, ethnic or racial slurs, and any other inflammatory language.”) 
 445 Michigan Virtual School, supra note 40. 
 446 Virginia Department of Education, supra note 42 at 16; see The School 
District of Philadelphia, supra note 40, at 7 (“Users shall not use the district’s 
Internet, computers or network resources to access, send, receive, transfer, view, 
share, or download material that is profane, obscene, pornographic, advocates 
illegal acts, or that advocates violence or discrimination towards other people 
(hate literature).”); see also id. at 8 (“Users shall not use obscene, profane, lewd, 
vulgar, rude, inflammatory, hateful, threatening or disrespectful language. 13. 
Users shall not engage in personal attacks, including prejudicial or 
discriminatory attacks.”). 
 447 Agora Cyber Charter School, supra note 50 at 43. 
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simply because he actually belongs to, or is perceived to belong to, 
a particular class.448 “Thus, epithets such as ‘nigger,’ ‘wetback,’ 
‘honkey,’ ‘kike,’ ‘gook,’ ‘spic,’ ‘faggot,’ ‘wop,’ or ‘mick,’ 
constitute hate speech when addressed to persons perceived to be 
members of the disfavored class.”449 
According to the Consortium for School Networking, many 
school districts are dropping their traditional AUP approaches, 
replacing them with “responsible use policies” (RUPs).450 RUPs 
are different from traditional AUPs in that they view and deal with 
“the student as a person responsible for ethical and healthy use of 
the Internet and mobile devices.” 451  Additionally, AUPs are 
“policies geared towards avoidance rather than education” whereas 
RUPs are geared toward education rather than avoidance.452 In 
essence, while AUPs focus on what students should not do, RUPs 
present what students should do—an educational approach. 453 
RUPs rely on students to make responsible choices among 
competing content and to learn from consequences of their choices 
                                                
 448 Michael S. Degan, “Adding the First Amendment to the Fire”: Cross 
Burning and Hate Crime Laws, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1109, 1112 (1993). 
 449 Id. at 1112–13. See id. at 1113 (“Whereas hate crimes involve the bias-
related selection of a victim in the commission of an otherwise criminal act, hate 
speech refers only to the biased content of certain speech. Theoretically, hate 
crimes do not necessarily contain an element of speech because an individual 
could remain silent during the commission of a hate crime, but the surrounding 
circumstances nevertheless may reveal a biased motive . . . However, a 
determination that an assailant has committed a hate crime generally requires the 
presence of spoken words reflecting the assailant’s biased motive.”). 
 450See generally CONSORTIUM FOR SCHOOL NETWORKING, MAKING PROGRESS: 
RETHINKING STATE AND SCHOOL DISTRICT POLICIES CONCERNING MOBILE 
TECHNOLOGIES AND SOCIAL MEDIA 2 (2012), http://www.splc.org/pdf/ 
making_progress_2012.pdf (last visited June 16, 2015) (discussing the move 
toward responsible use policies). See also Chamberlain et al., supra note 442, at 1. 
 451 CONSORTIUM FOR SCHOOL NETWORKING, supra note 450, at 6. 
 452 Chamberlain et al., supra note 442, at 1. 
 453 CONSORTIUM FOR SCHOOL NETWORKING, supra note 450, at 6 (2012); see 
also Chamberlain et al., supra note 442, at 3 (“Many acceptable use policies for 
students read like a list of unacceptable uses . . .”). 
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through such measures as school discipline and teachable 
moments.454 
Even then, whenever a school disciplines a student for speech 
choices, pursuant to an AUP or an RUP, based on the content of 
the speech, a question arises as to whether the school is acting 
within constitutional bounds; particularly because the First 
Amendment does not favor content-based censorship.455 In fact, the 
analysis of such AUPs or RUPs must begin with the fact that 
content-based restrictions on speech are “presumptively invalid.”456 
The censoring government entity can overcome the presumption 
by showing that the content of the speech has “such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”457 Speech that the Supreme Court has found to satisfy 
this standard, and therefore qualified per se for content-based 
restrictions, are fighting words,458 obscenity,459 defamation,460 child 
pornography, 461  and true threats. 462  A school can censor these 
categories of speech “because of their constitutionally proscribable 
                                                
 454 Bosco, supra note 39 at 2. 
 455 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642–43 (1994) (“[W]hile a 
content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a 
regulation is content based, it is not necessary to such a showing in all cases. 
Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be enough to save a law 
which, on its face, discriminates based on content.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 456 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); Daniel Aisaka 
& Rachel Clune, Hate Crime Regulation And Challenges, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & 
L. 469, 479 (2013). 
 457 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 458 Id. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering 
the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2355 (1989) (“[R]acist speech is so 
common that it is seen as part of the ordinary jostling and conflict people are 
expected to tolerate, rather than as fighting words.”). 
 459 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); See also Joseph O. Oluwole, 
Preston C. Green, & Melissa Stackpole, SextEd: Obscenity Versus Free Speech 
In Our Schools, 25-49 (2013); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 460 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 461 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Oluwole et al., supra note 459, 
at 51–66 (2013). 
 462 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
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content” but it cannot censor their non-proscribable content 
because it favors or disfavors the content.463 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of content-based hate speech restrictions in R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota.464 In that case, the city of St. Paul, 
Minnesota alleged that petitioner and other teenagers burned a 
cross in an African American family’s yard.465 The city charged the 
petitioner with a hate crime under an ordinance that regulated 
speech on the basis of its content: 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, 
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a 
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable 
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the 
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly 
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.466 
This provision is very similar to those of the AUPs above that 
single out speech for regulation on such basis as race. The 
petitioner challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional content-
based discrimination under the First Amendment.467 The Supreme 
Court agreed, holding that the ordinance unconstitutionally barred 
“otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the 
speech addresses.”468 The Court ruled that government entities 
cannot regulate speech based on hostility or favor toward the 
speech.469 
The Court found unacceptable that, under the ordinance, 
“[d]isplays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or 
severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the 
specified disfavored topics.”470 Therefore, “[t]hose who wish to use 
‘fighting words’ in connection with other ideas—to express 
hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union 
                                                
 463 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383–84, 386–87 (1992). 
 464 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 465 Id. at 379. 
 466 Id. at 380. 
 467 Id. 
 468 Id. 
 469 Id. at 386. 
 470 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391. 
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membership, or homosexuality—are not covered.”471 Unlike the 
other virtual schools’ provisions referenced above, Agora Cyber 
Charter School’s provision bars all uses of derogatory 
comments.472 Further, it merely uses classes such as race, gender, 
sexual orientation, inter alia, as examples, as evident in its use of 
the word “including.”473 As a result, Agora’s provision is unlike the 
St. Paul ordinance. Thus, the Court might not find Agora’s 
provision as objectionable as St. Paul’s ordinance, which only 
barred “abusive invective”, based on the specified classes.474 
As part of its content-based analysis, the Court also found St. 
Paul’s ordinance unconstitutional because it promoted viewpoint 
discrimination.475 Specifically, the Court objected to the ordinance 
only prohibiting fighting words that, for instance, invoked race (or 
any of the other classes) in a negative sense while allowing use in a 
positive sense: 
In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond 
mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination. 
Displays containing some words—odious racial epithets, for 
example—would be prohibited to proponents of all views. But ‘fighting 
words’ that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or 
gender—aspersions upon a person’s mother, for example—would 
seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor 
of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but could not be used by 
those speakers’ opponents. One could hold up a sign saying, for 
example, that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten; but not that all 
‘papists’ are, for that would insult and provoke violence ‘on the basis of 
religion.’ St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate 
to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of 
Queensberry rules.476 
The Court explained that while the city should confront 
fighting words that include “messages of ‘bias-motivated’ hatred 
                                                
 471 Id. 
 472 Agora Cyber Charter School, supra note 50 at 42. 
 473 Id. 
 474 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391. 
 475 Id. See Geng, supra note 1, at 163–64 (2014) (“[E]ven in situations where 
the government makes content-based regulations, those regulations must still be 
viewpoint-neutral.”). 
 476 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391–92. 
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and in particular, as applied to this case, messages ‘based on 
virulent notions of racial supremacy’ . . . the manner of that 
confrontation cannot consist of selective limitations upon 
speech.”477 
Despite the Supreme Court’s evident admission that burning of 
crosses in others’ yards is “reprehensible,”478 the Court made a 
notable observation; notable because it revealed the Court’s 
distaste for content-based regulation of hate speech even when the 
speech is despised: 
St. Paul’s brief asserts that a general ‘fighting words’ law would not 
meet the city’s needs because only a content-specific measure can 
communicate to minority groups that the ‘group hatred’ aspect of such 
speech ‘is not condoned by the majority.’ The point of the First 
Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some 
fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content.479 
This is disfavorable because the Court is in essence 
encouraging broader censorship of speech than is necessary to 
achieve effective regulation of hate speech.480 
                                                
 477 Id. at 392. 
 478 Id. See Matsuda, supra note 458, at 2353 (noting the values that have led to 
protection of even racist expressions are “part of the American structure of 
government and the American commitment to political and civil rights. The 
American position may be extreme, but it responds to American circumstances. 
It recalls the times when our commitment to freedom was tested — the Sedition 
Act, the McCarthy era, the movement for racial justice, the riots and protests of 
the Vietnam age. Our commitment to the position has been neither steadfast nor 
universal. Judges have sometimes failed to understand it, resulting in loose 
doctrinal ends. The basic principle, however, has survived, and the thrust of the 
cases and commentary supports first amendment primacy.”). 
 479 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396. 
 480 Id. at 393–94 ( The Court added that the city’s content-based regulation of 
hate speech did not fit any of the exceptions to unconstitutional content-based 
regulation; and its selective focus on race, gender and religion was problematic: 
The content-based discrimination reflected in the St. Paul ordinance comes 
within neither any of the specific exceptions [obscenity and defamation] to the 
First Amendment prohibition we discussed earlier nor a more general exception 
for content discrimination that does not threaten censorship of ideas. It assuredly 
does not fall within the exception for content discrimination based on the very 
reasons why the particular class of speech at issue (here, fighting words) is 
proscribable. As explained earlier, the reason why fighting words are 	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The Court ruled that a content-based regulation is only 
permissible if the government entity has a compelling end for the 
regulation; and the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling end.481 The city of St. Paul argued that its regulation 
was driven by a compelling interest in affording human rights and 
protection to groups that have historically faced discrimination; 
and enabling them to live without harassment.482 The Supreme 
Court did not dismiss these interests as non-compelling.483 Instead, 
the Court stated that “[w]e do not doubt that these interests are 
compelling, and that the ordinance can be said to promote them.”484 
Similarly, schools have reason to censor hate speech since such 
speech carries real health consequences for students: 
“physiological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear 
in the gut, rapid pulse rate and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psychosis, and 
suicide.”485 It causes such inner pain for the victims that hate 
                                                                                                         
categorically excluded from the protection of the First Amendment is not that 
their content communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a 
particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever 
idea the speaker wishes to convey. St. Paul has not singled out an especially 
offensive mode of expression—it has not, for example, selected for prohibition 
only those fighting words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed 
to a merely obnoxious) manner. Rather, it has proscribed fighting words of 
whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious 
intolerance. Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the city is seeking 
to handicap the expression of particular ideas. That possibility would alone be 
enough to render the ordinance presumptively invalid, but St. Paul’s comments 
and concessions in this case elevate the possibility to a certainty) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 481 Id. at 395. 
 482 Id. 
 483 Id. 
 484 Id. 
 485 Matsuda, supra note 458, at 2336. See id. at 2340 (“Psychologists and 
sociologists have done much to document the effects of racist messages on both 
victims and dominant-group members. Writers of color have given us graphic 
portrayals of what life is like for victims of racist propaganda . . . From the 
victim’s perspective racist hate messages cause real damage.”). 
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speech has been characterized as a murder of the spirit.486 Victims 
end up isolating themselves from others, self-censoring, and even 
stopping their education. 487  In fact, research reveals that the 
psychological damage from hate speech can be crushing and 
unavoidable:488 
Research in psychosocial and psycholinguistic analysis of racism 
suggests a related effect of racist hate propaganda: at some level, no 
matter how much both victims and well-meaning dominant-group 
members resist it, racial inferiority is planted in our minds as an idea 
that may hold some truth. The idea is improbable and abhorrent, but it 
is there before us, because it is presented repeatedly. ‘Those people’ are 
lazy, dirty, sexualized, money-grubbing, dishonest, inscrutable, we are 
told. We reject the idea, but the next time we sit next to one of ‘those 
people’ the dirt message, the sex message, is triggered. We stifle it, 
reject it as wrong, but it is there, interfering with our perception and 
interaction with the person next to us. For the victim, similarly, the 
angry rejection of the message of inferiority is coupled with absorption 
of the message. When a dominant-group member responds favorably, 
there is a moment of relief – the victims of hate messages do not 
always believe in their insides that they deserve decent treatment. This 
obsequious moment is degrading and dispiriting when the self-aware 
victim acknowledges it.489 
A problem could arise for students if the Supreme Court deems 
these health damages as mere emotional consequences of speech. 
After all, the Court has ruled that “[t]he emotive impact of speech 
on its audience” is not a constitutionally-recognized exception to 
the rule against content-based regulation.490 
                                                
 486 Id. at 2336–37 (citing Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: 
The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law’s Response to Racism, 42 MIAMI L. 
REV. 127, 139 (1987)). 
 487 Matsuda, supra note 458 at 2336–37. 
 488 Id. at 2237–41. 
 489 Id. at 2239–40. See also id. at 2237–38. (“One subconscious response is to 
reject one’s own identity as a victim-group member. As writers portraying the 
African-American experience have noted, the price of disassociating from one’s 
own race is often sanity itself. As much as one may try to resist a piece of hate 
propaganda, the effect on one’s self-esteem and sense of personal security is 
devastating. To be hated, despised, and alone is the ultimate fear of all human 
beings. However irrational racist speech may be, it hits right at the emotional 
place where we feel the most pain.”). 
 490 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394. 
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Even if the Court finds these interests compelling, the 
challenge lies in whether the content-based regulation is narrowly 
tailored to serve the compelling interests.491 Schools would have to 
ensure that there are no content-neutral alternatives that can readily 
address the compelling interests.492 According to the Court, “the 
danger of censorship presented by a facially content-based statute, 
requires that weapon be employed only where it is necessary to 
serve the asserted [compelling] interest. The existence of adequate 
content-neutral alternatives thus undercut[s] significantly any 
defense of such a statute.”493 
The Court’s disfavor of content-based discrimination might 
make it inclined to find AUPs that single out specific content for 
regulation unconstitutional.494 After all, the Court signaled just that 
in R.A.V., when it found that, even if the city had compelling 
interests, its content-based regulation was not narrowly tailored.495 
The Court artfully reasoned that there was at least one content-
neutral alternative available: 
An ordinance not limited to the favored topics, for example, would 
have precisely the same beneficial effect. In fact the only interest 
distinctively served by the content limitation is that of displaying the 
city council’s special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled 
out. That is precisely what the First Amendment forbids. The 
politicians of St. Paul are entitled to express that hostility—but not 
through the means of imposing unique limitations upon speakers who 
(however benightedly) disagree.496 
                                                
 491 Id. at 395. 
 492 Id. 
 493 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 494 This would especially be so when the student is regarded as off-campus, 
and thus in citizen status, under the Constitution, similar to all citizens including 
adults. For citizens, “[w]hat the American position means in the area of race is 
that expressions of the ideas of racial inferiority or racial hatred are protected. 
Anyone who wants to say that African Americans and Jews are inferior and 
deserving of persecution is entitled to. However loathsome this idea may be, it is 
still political speech. The law becomes strong at its edges.” Matsuda, supra note 
458 at 2351 (1989). 
 495 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395. 
 496 Id. 
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Similarly, the Court might artfully and painstakingly search out 
content-neutral alternatives to content-based provisions in AUPs. 
The Court distinguished St. Paul’s ordinance from Title VII, 
which prohibits employment discrimination on grounds such as 
race and gender, inter alia.497 Distinctively, the Court noted that 
Title VII did not violate the First Amendment’s content-neutral 
requirement because Title VII’s prohibition of racial and gender is 
merely a “content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of 
speech . . . swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute 
directed at conduct rather than speech.”498 In other words, Title VII 
was designed to target conduct, not speech; the regulation of 
speech is merely incidental to regulation of conduct. Thus, AUPs 
that similarly regulate conduct, with mere incidental regulation of 
speech, would survive a content-based discrimination challenge. 
The synopsis is that, in assessing AUP content-based 
censorship of hate speech, the Court would look to whether the 
school can achieve the same end—prohibition of hate speech—
with a broader prohibition that does not single out specific content 
such as race, gender, or sexual orientation. Before adopting 
content-based regulation of hate speech, schools must, therefore, 
make a conscientious effort to justify that the regulation is 
narrowly tailored. They can accomplish this by documenting that 
there were no content-neutral alternatives; or that content-neutral 
alternatives would not achieve “precisely the same” compelling 
end.499 
XI. CONCLUSION 
The emergence of virtual schools, blended with opportunities 
for potentially far-reaching virtual student speech, has raised new 
challenges for school officials seeking to censor student speech; 
particularly because of the Internet’s pervasiveness and borderless 
nature. It has also fueled further uncertainty regarding the 
distinction between on-campus speech and off-campus speech. 
                                                
 497 Id. at 389. 
 498 Id. (applying the reasoning to the other protected classes under Title VII.). 
 499 Id. at 396. 
304 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 17: 221 
While the debate over the distinction between on-campus and off-
campus speech preceded the advent of the Internet, the fusion of 
schooling and the Internet has distended the ambivalence in the 
off-campus versus on-campus jurisprudence. Schools officials and 
students are unsure of the scope of their censorship authority and 
their First Amendment rights, respectively. 
This Article provided some clarity for school officials. The 
analysis revealed that school officials can censor virtual student 
speech based on the forum—traditional public forum, designated 
public forum, limited public forum, nonpublic forum—of the 
speech. They can also censor all virtual speech that qualifies as 
government speech. However, when schools use AUPs and RUPs 
to censor student speech, the provisions of those policies could be 
challenged as unconstitutional content-based discrimination; 
especially when those policies seek to regulate hate speech. 
Schools that rely on AUPs and RUPs to censor hate speech must 
ensure that they can clearly articulate compelling reason(s) for 
those censorship provisions; and that the censorship in the 
provisions is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling reason(s). 
What emerges from the analysis in this Article is that “[e]ven with 
the vastly increased opportunity to speak and be heard created by 
the Internet, the exceptions to First Amendment protection for 
student speech remain narrowly drawn even for immature and 
foolishly defiant students.”500 Accordingly, the First Amendment 
remains a safe haven for students. 
The analysis in this Article also revealed that virtual schools 
can censor on-campus speech pursuant to the four Supreme Court 
tests for student speech: the material and substantial disruption test, 
the Bethel test, the Hazelwood test and the Morse test. When 
speech is off-campus courts require that school officials establish a 
nexus between the speech and the school. School officials should 
not, however, be allowed to “police students’ out-of-school speech 
                                                
 500 Beidler v. North Thurston School District No. 99-2-00236-6, 3 (Wash. 
Super. Ct.) (July 18, 2000). 
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by patrolling the public discourse.”501 Even if school officials are 
empowered to censor on-campus speech in order to maintain the 
educational environment, students need an outlet, or safe space, to 
express pent up emotions through speech. As evident in the cases 
discussed earlier, student speech that schools seek to censor is 
imbued with emotions. With the controlled nature of the campus 
environment, the outlet and safe space for venting students is 
typically off-campus. 
Students must be allowed to express themselves cognitively 
and emotionally, particularly when they are not engaged in school-
related work. Such expression might be a way to avert another 
tragedy as happened at Columbine High School.502 If students 
know they have an outlet for their emotions, they might be less 
inclined to engage in depravity (as happened at Columbine High 
School); or even to act irresponsibly upon pent-up emotions.503 
This need to protect emotionally-charged speech is important even 
if the speech is critical of school officials. As the United States 
Supreme Court stated in Cohen v. California: 
We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of 
the cognitive content of individual speech has little or no regard for that 
emotive function which practically speaking, may often be the more 
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated. 
Indeed, . . . [o]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the 
right to criticize public men and measures—and that means not only 
informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly 
and without moderation.504 
Indeed, “[i]f societies are not to explode from festering 
tensions, there must be valves through which citizens may blow off 
steam. Openness fosters resiliency; peaceful protest displaces more 
                                                
 501 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 217 n.16 
(3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 502 See David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship Of Student Internet Speech: The 
Effect Of Diminishing Student Rights, Fear Of The Internet And Columbine, 
2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 199 (2000) (discussing the Columbine 
High School tragedy). 
 503 The outlet of expression might also enable schools to quickly identify 
students who need help so that appropriate intervention can be provided. 
 504 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
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violence than it triggers; free debate dissipates more hate than it 
stirs.”505 
                                                
 505 Clay Calvert, Off-campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of 
the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 282 (2001) 
(citing Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech In An Open Society, 13 (1992)). 
